

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

VOL II No. 2

OCTOBER 1960

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The Journal of

THE DAVID DAVIES MEMORIAL INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

PRICE 4/-

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ON UNDERSTANDING INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

A. APPADORAI

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In a thoughtful article "On Understanding Indian Foreign Policy" in *International Relations*, April 1959, Alan De Russett invited a debate on the foundations of that policy, and on the assumptions concerning international society which give meaning to it.

The main ideas underlying India's foreign policy which, Russett says, were somewhat misunderstood up to 1956 are now clearly grasped in the West, and, in particular, non-alignment, the desire to end colonialism, the opposition to racial discrimination, the seeking of economic aid from the West as well as the East in order to hasten economic development, the emphasis upon negotiation and other methods of peaceful settlement of disputes and the desirability of improving the machinery of the United Nations for the tasks of peace rather than those of war are fully understood. What the West would like to know more clearly is India's view on how peace is, and can be, maintained in a society of sovereign states. Two specific issues relating to the maintenance of peace are raised by Russett :—

The Western view has been that in order to maintain peace, primary attention must be given to the establishment and preservation of power in international society with its corollaries, armaments and alliances. Negotiation and compromise are possible and necessary on innumerable matters that do not closely affect the relative power status, but not in a situation likely to disturb the equilibrium of power. Armaments and military alliances, on the one hand, and negotiation and compromise, on the other, are, in the Western view, supplementary and not opposed. Ideally, the society of sovereign states should secure peace through a democratic world government, but, in the absence of world government, the balance of power system is the only other way known of distributing power so that it restrains resort to violence. No doubt it is a poor second best, but without it the will to negotiate vanishes when all can freely choose between it and the violent achievement of their ends ; the courage to trust disappears when the price of miscalculation is total conquest.

The Indian approach to peace, including its emphasis on the role of the United Nations for the tasks of peace rather than of war, seems, according to Russett, to ignore the crucial place of power in international politics ; Western policies and Indian policy are presented by Indian statesmen and scholars as opposites, and an

antithesis is created between India's peace approach and the West's pursuit of the balance of power.

Can there be a meeting point of the two approaches, so that power is recognized as the basic fact of international society while, at the same time peace is made possible?

If Asia is basically more inclined towards peace than towards conflict, as Indian statesmen have said, can Asian history and experience be examined to see whether the prevalent theory held in the West can be modified and enriched to achieve a common goal, namely, the maintenance of international peace without armaments and military alliances?

I. The Foundations of Peace

India is still groping in the dark to find stable foundations for peace in an atomic age ; if she had the talisman for achieving that aim we should already have secured a " peaceful " peace instead of continuing to live in the " fearful " peace in which we find ourselves now. Having admitted this, India's own view of the foundations of peace may be stated thus : (A) the balance of power, whether it was useful or not to preserve peace in the pre-atomic age, cannot preserve it in the atomic age ; and (B) the approach to peace in the atomic age, while not ignoring the realities of power, is to be looked for in successfully exploring, more fully than was necessary in an earlier age, the potentialities of negotiation and other means of peaceful settlement of conflicts and in promoting active peaceful cooperation between states. Each of these points needs some elaboration.

(A) *The Inadequacy of the Balance of Power Theory* : The classic statement of the theory of the balance of power is found in the well-known " Memorandum on the present state of British Relations with France and Germany " prepared by Sir Eyre Crowe in 1907.¹

" History shows that the danger threatening the independence of this or that nation has generally arisen, at least in part, out of the momentary predominance of a neighbouring state at once militarily powerful, economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread its influence, the danger being directly proportionate to the degree of its power and efficiency, and to the spontaneity or ' inevitableness ' of its ambitions. The only check on the abuse of political predominance derived from such a position has always consisted in the opposition of an equally formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries forming leagues of defence. The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power, and it has become almost an historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance

¹*British Documents on the Origin of the War 1898-1914*, edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London 1928), Vol. III, p. 403.

of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to the political dictatorship or the strongest single state or group at a given time."

The essence of the policy, in Vattel's words, is an attempt at securing a political equilibrium "by which is understood such a disposition of things as no power is able absolutely to predominate, or to prescribe law to others".

Indian opinion inclines to the view that while, in certain social and political conditions, the balance of power system was able to maintain a precarious peace, it cannot be counted upon to maintain even such a precarious peace under different conditions, such as those which have prevailed since 1945, though a desire not to disturb an existing balance is understandable though not always justifiable.

India's spokesman at the General Assembly expressed this view in a speech on 4 October 1955 :—

"We have found that the promotion of neighbourliness, agreements on non-aggression and mutual respect are ways of promoting cooperation. It may be asked : Is your system likely to succeed? Can you rely on it? With great respect, we are entitled to ask : Have the other systems succeeded? Can anybody turn round to us and say that the doctrine of the balance of power is more likely to help us, or to succeed—that doctrine which is the legacy of Metternich, or Castlereagh and of Talleyrand, which wrecked the principle of universalism and culminated in the war of 1914, and which to this day is making its incursions into international affairs? I am reminded of the statement of a great Frenchman, Rousseau, who said that the strongest is never strong enough to be always master unless he transfers strength into right and obedience into duty."

India's view as stated above, it may be added, is in keeping with informed opinion in the West. International historians and political scientists of the standing of Toynbee and Morgenthau, among others, have after painstaking research come to the same conclusion.¹

Morgenthau, the brilliant analyst of the concept of the balance of power, has convincingly shown² that the destruction of that intellectual and moral consensus which restrained the struggle for power for almost three centuries has deprived the balance of power of the vital energy that made it a living principle of international

¹ See in particular Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (Third Edition), Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1960, pp. 167-226 and pp. 346-64 and the references cited therein ; Ernest B. Haas, "The Balance of Power : Prescription, Concept of Propaganda" *World Politics*, Vol. 5, pp. 442-77 ; Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. 3, Oxford University Press, 1934, Alfred Vagts "The Balance of Power : Growth of an Idea", *World Politics*, Vol. 1, pp. 82-101 and Andrew M. Scott, "Challenge and Response : A Tool for the Analysis of International Affairs", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 18, pp. 207-26.

² Hans Morgenthau, *op. cit.* pp. 346-64.

politics. This apart, Morgenthau adds, important developments in international politics since 1945 such as the numerical reduction of Great Powers from eight (in the 19th century) to two, in other words, the bipolarity of power and the disappearance of the balancer (Britain had played the part successfully for two centuries) and the disappearance of the colonial frontier have considerably impaired the usefulness of the system.

The most important development which has, in India's view, made the system of a balance of power out-dated is the discovery of nuclear weapons which, in Winston Churchill's phrase, has brought about "a balance of terror". The implications of this, in the context of the theory of the balance of power, have not been adequately realized : the achievement of atomic parity between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. would help to maintain the balance of power is such parity were an effective deterrent to attack by either, but, if it is not an effective deterrent, it may lead to total destruction. It is sufficient to say that, in India's view, the possession of nuclear weapons by both the superpowers is *not* a clear deterrent. *Prima facie* it would be consoling to think that either party, certain of having to face retaliation if any all-out war is begun by the other, is bound to desist from an attempt which is certain to destroy itself. But a deeper analysis would indicate that a military balance is "a slender reed" to lean upon for two reasons : historically it is an ironical but demonstrable law that nations which have armed themselves to preserve the peace have seldom avoided war if only because reason cannot always control political passions and even if it does, accidents play a part in events. And, secondly, an atomic stalemate can continue to be such only so long as the two Powers, who possess the destructive weapons, continue always to be equal in their power. Such an assumption can be valid only if technology is stabilised, but we know for certain that this is far from being the case where weapons development is concerned.

In these circumstances, India would subscribe to the view expressed by the President of the Bandung Conference :¹ "We know too well from the lessons of history that power politics, with an uneasy balance of power in its wake, cannot guarantee peace but will lead sooner or later to war", which, with the Hydrogen bomb, may, in Einstein's view, lead to the *annihilation of any life on earth*.²

(B) *Approach to peace* : If the balance of power cannot do the trick, what then is India's position in regard to the approach to the maintenance of peace? India's approach, it seems to the present writer, has two elements which it would be useful to develop separately. One is non-alignment, and the second, emphasis upon negotiation and other peaceful methods of arriving at a settlement of conflicts.

¹ Opening Address at the Asian-African Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djakarta, 1955.

² *New York Times*, 13 February 1950.

As, according to Rusett, India's non-alignment policy has not only been understood in the West, but also accepted at its honest face value, there is no need here to develop the historical, geographical and political basis of that policy. But Rusett's article suggests that there are still two misconceptions on this point. The first is a suspicion that the non-alignment policy which India has adopted is a valid prescription for all : says Rusett, "India's chosen role, therefore, is not explained in terms of her favourable power position, but is held up as a *model for all to follow*, regardless of their size, position or past experience of present neighbours" (*italics ours*). It is possible that the statements of some Indian statesmen or scholars in the past have justified such an inference, and it must be admitted that they have not always been as carefully, or precisely formulated as is necessary ; it is sufficient to say, however, that the latest declaration by the Prime Minister of India on this subject¹ should dispel such misgivings :

"We are geographically situated to play the role of non-alignment and geography points a great deal in such matters. If you are a small country surrounded by great, big and hostile powers, then it is not an easy matter for such a country to face the situation bravely and to call itself non-aligned . . . it (non-alignment) might not suit everybody ; although it would seem good for everybody, it might be more difficult for others."

In the second place it would appear from Rusett's analysis that India is anxious to be a great mediator, but that in order to fulfil her chosen role, she depends on the condition of equilibrium created by others. Says Rusett, "India, therefore, can exploit in the cause of peace a condition created by others, so long as her participation is not necessary to its successful creation. She can supplement the fundamental and indispensable spade work of the power-balancers" ; and again, "Hence to put it colloquially others can do the dirty work, for, maintaining a power balance is a rather soul destroying task, though none the less necessary for that ; and history shows how happily nations will, if they can, opt out of their duties in this respect ; the United States did so far too long, not so long ago. But unlike the United States, India can do so without disastrous results. She can keep her mediatory hands clean for the benefit of the world and aid the West in its ultimate objectives". The present writer would agree with Rusett's analysis of the facts ; to be just to India, it is essential to add that, not being a great power, India has always been acutely conscious of her own limitations and of the results of her conciliatory and mediatory efforts and that such conciliation and mediation as she has undertaken has not been due to her own desire to play the mediatory role but to the invitation to her (being a non-aligned power) by both the parties to the dispute in question.

¹ Address to the Indian Council of World Affairs, 5 April 1960.

Now to the main question, what is India's view on how peace can be maintained in a society of sovereign states?

The present writer, after some study of India's traditions and current thinking both official and non-official, would attempt to answer the question thus :

There are two parallel ways to peace, one to tackle the roots of conflict (social, economic and political) and the other to attempt to resolve a given conflict without recourse to violence so that there may be a reduction in international tensions arising from that conflict, even if the conflict itself may not be resolved.

The ending of colonialism and racialism, the raising of the living standards of people in underdeveloped countries and the promotion of the temper of peace in as wide an area as possible will help to tackle the roots of conflict. The promotion of the temper of peace will be facilitated by disarmament and by the "recognition of each other's sovereignty, independence and integrity, or non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other or of other countries, and on the promotion, both for themselves and for the world, of the approach and conditions of peaceful coexistence"—principles which are all to be found in the United Nations Charter. Wars arise in the minds of men and the promotion of the temper of peace will help to promote a climate of peace.

This, clearly, is a long-term approach and recognized as such not only by India but by other countries. India knows that conflicts, nevertheless, do and will occur as verbal statements are not always kept and *Panchsheel* may be broken as she realized most clearly in the case of Hungary in 1956 and China's encroachment on Indian territory in 1959-60. To resolve conflicts which have arisen, India's view is that the manner of approach to it must be peaceful—not one of hatred and revenge, but a friendly one. In the words of the Prime Minister :¹

"Whatever the problems, difficult or simple, the manner of approach will make a difference. And you know if you approach them in anger, hatred, in a spirit of violence, then the problems become difficult and indeed much more difficult and much less amenable to solution. So the Indian approach, whether you live up to it or not is a different matter, but the philosophy behind the Indian approach is, as far as possible, a friendly approach : not giving in or accepting what we consider wrong, nevertheless trying to tone down, first our actions and words, and if possible, our thinking to some extent from cold-war thinking . . . to hold to what we consider right, firmly and without fear and yet not to speak about opponents in terms which would worsen the situation . . . it may be said by many that it is an idealistic way of approaching world

¹ *ibid.*

problems . . . and yet this is not only an idealistic way but in the circumstances of the world today, I submit, the only practical way, strictly from the practical point of view and that is why the leaders of other countries not accepting perhaps the philosophy of this practically are functioning or coming round to functioning on those lines ”.

The Indian approach proceeds on the assumption that peace cannot be promoted by creating positions of strength ; on the contrary, the creation of positions of strength might become a threat to peace—for every party will naturally try to increase its strength *vis-à-vis* its competitors for power, and such an attempt is suicidal in the atomic age. Entering into military alliances and the establishment of military bases in foreign territory accentuates discord and the possibility of war. The peaceful approach—which also does not guarantee peace—has to be tried if only because there is no other. Its essential is the determination to avoid force, for the use of violence creates more problems than the one it solves if, indeed, its use does not lead to world destruction ; hence discussion, negotiation and accommodation are the only way left for the settlement of differences. It is remarkable that the Eisenhower-Kruschev statement issued after the talks at Camp David accepts this position. “ The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States agreed that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation ”. On the eve of his tour to the Far East in June 1960, President Eisenhower again emphasised that among most of the world’s peoples, there now is a genuine consensus of conviction that we can, by negotiation, solve even the most difficult of international problems.

India’s emphasis upon negotiation, it should be added, derives its *raison d’être* not only from the conditions of modern warfare but also from a belief that invariably in genuine international disputes, both the parties to a dispute are likely to have a just cause, the difference being only in degree—a point emphasised by Gentili, the distinguished international jurist of the seventeenth century, in the following words :¹

“ In general, it may be true in nearly every kind of dispute, that neither of the two disputants is unjust. . . . We are driven to this distinction by the weakness of our human nature, because of which we see everything dimly, and are not cognizant of that purest and truest form of justice ; which cannot conceive of both parties to a dispute being in the right. . . . Therefore we aim at justice as it appears from man’s standpoint ”.

What does all this boil down to in terms of the question raised by Russett : Does such an approach guarantee peace? No, but neither

¹ Alberico Gentili, *De Wire Belli Libri Tres*, Vol. II Translation of the edition of 1612 (Oxford, 1933) pp. 31-32.

did the traditional approach guarantee peace. Is it another way, a way different from the one adopted by the West, to secure peace? No, Russett is right in arguing that this approach is supplementary to the one based on power—but supplementary with a difference. Those who approach problems in this way do not close their door to, but emphasize, negotiation, and are careful more than others to watch for opportunities for negotiation and try to make a success of it as much as is possible in the circumstances ; the truces secured in Korea and Indo-China are cases in point. It is true that the unwillingness of the parties to the conflicts to use their destructive weapons supported, in the instances cited, the temper of peace, or perhaps vice-versa ; but that exactly is the utility of the approach in present conditions in the world. The temper of peace is no panacea for the evils of international power politics but is supplementary to power. Russett is right, if its supplementary value is recognised to the proper degree.

The vital issue for international politics raised by Russett's excellent analysis, then, is : Are the techniques of negotiation and other peaceful methods of settlement potentially capable of yielding more successful results than they have yielded so far? War has often been resorted to in the past when peaceful means of adjustment failed ; under modern conditions of warfare, war, it is recognised, cannot be a useful alternative to peaceful means of adjustment. Can we then fall back on the only other alternative available in order that adjustment of differences is possible and some satisfaction can be obtained by the parties concerned?

Posing the question in this way may surprise orthodox students of international politics as being against the verdict of history ; indeed it may be considered naïve, as it would appear to be based on an over-optimistic view of human nature. Such a view, I suggest, would be hasty and unhistorical. The world's attention is unfortunately focussed more on the differences which have arisen between states, and less on the agreements which have been arrived at. It would, historically, be correct to say that more differences have been settled by discussion and agreement than by resort to war ; the records of the day-to-day activities in the chancellories of the world, if available to the student, would substantiate this view. To take a few examples from recent history : truces (not peace agreements) have been secured in Korea, Indo-China and Kashmir ; some progress has been achieved over nuclear disarmament, the principle of international control and inspection being also accepted by the Soviet Union after years of negotiations ; the Austrian treaty has been signed. Coming nearer home, France agreed to transfer to India her possessions in India, India agreeing to safeguards for the protection of French culture in those territories. The canal water dispute between India and Pakistan has been settled ; and differences

between the two countries over border adjustments have also been successfully resolved.¹

The question naturally arises, what explains the fact that some success has been achieved by negotiation in these instances? The anatomy of negotiation suggests that when two or more parties disagree on a question, two factors play a part in resolving their differences, one, the fear on the part of any party to the dispute that superior force might be used to settle the difference, and the other, the sense of accommodation which suggests that while its own vital interests must be safeguarded, consideration must also be given to the interests of the other party or parties. It is not easy to isolate these two factors and say which has played the greater part in the final settlement of the differences at issue : there are too many variables to be taken into account in assessing the sources of fear of force on the one hand, and the sense of accommodation on the other. Thus force is a function of several factors : geographical position, economic resources, the strength of government and the leaders in power, diplomatic finesse, armaments, alliances, and the morale of the people of the country in question ; the sense of accommodation is a compound of the innate sense of justice, the desire to placate public opinion at home and abroad, and the desire to have some stability in the settlement to be arrived at. These apart, another factor in the situation, invariably, is conflicting interpretation of the facts in question ; this acts as a sort of brake on the willingness to use force, and as an ally to the sense of accommodation.

If this analysis is correct, it follows that where negotiations have been successful, the sense of accommodation has played a greater part than power, and that where negotiations have not been successful, the reverse has been the case ; the sense of accommodation is itself affected by the extent of the interest that the protagonists attach to the issue in dispute.

In sum, the essence of an approach to successful negotiation, through history, has been to see that when differences of opinion have arisen between two or more parties on a matter which concerns them, an attempt must be made to settle the differences in such a manner that none of the parties suffers a significant loss ; for only then would the result be stable.² It would be wrong to consider

¹ There are, of course, innumerable instances to illustrate the reverse of the picture, viz. that differences have not always been adjusted : the delay in coming to terms on disarmament, Berlin, the continuing dispute in respect of the treatment of racial minorities especially in South Africa, the vexed question of West Irian, the trouble over the use of the Suez canal by Israeli ships, the failure of the Summit Conference over the issue of America's sending the U-2 plane over the Soviet Union and so on.

² This statement excludes stable results achieved by means of war, e.g. war did settle the relation between Britain and the thirteen American colonies more or less on a stable basis.

this as a distinctly *Indian* approach ; it is integral to true negotiation as such. This tradition is explicitly mentioned in the Indian epic, the *Mahabharata*. When Sri Krishna was about to proceed for negotiations to bring about a settlement between the Pandavas and Kurus, he summarised the object of his mission in the following words :¹

“ Yes, I will go to King Dhritarashtra, desirous of accomplishing what is consistent with righteousness, what may be beneficial to us and what also is for the good of the Kurus ”.

We suggest that this has been the universal tradition, not always consistently followed but nevertheless more often followed by negotiators in every country than statesmen are prepared to admit. The willingness to submit a dispute to a third-party judgement, as may be seen in the numerous cases referred to arbitration, can be explained only by the existence in the disputants of that spirit of accommodation and of willingness to see the other man's point of view which is so essential in order to avoid a breakdown. The Indian emphasis on negotiation as a way to peace only highlights a well-known technique and its utility in the atomic age. Indeed the debate, which Russett correctly suggests should continue, should be, I suggest, not on the issue whether negotiation should be an alternative to the use of force (as there is no disagreement here) but on how to improve the techniques of negotiation and other peaceful methods of settlement so that they may yield the desired results. In a remarkable article contributed to *Diplomacy in a Changing World*, Dag Hammarskjöld writes that in the diplomacy of world organisation, “ the quiet work of preparing the ground, of accommodation of interest and view point, of conciliation and mediation, all that goes into the winning of consent to agreed solutions and common programmes, this forms a basis upon which the United Nations can become an increasingly influential and effective force² to aid governments in pursuit of the goals of the Charter ” and again, “ we can register efforts to give such diplomacy the support of firmer procedures ”. It is true that in the past, negotiation has not always succeeded and hence wars have occurred so often ; wars in the modern age must be avoided if mankind is to survive ; can we then, from a study of cases of negotiation both successful and unsuccessful,

¹ *The Mahabharata* (translated into English prose) by Pratapachandra Roy, Udyoga Parva (Calcutta, 1890) p. 256.

² Dag Hammarskjöld, “ The Role of the United Nations ” in *Diplomacy in a Changing World* edited by Stephen D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1959). In support, Hammarskjöld cites three instances viz. agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy and agreement on the details concerning the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force arrived at by government representatives sitting as members of Advisory Committees to the Secretary-General and discussing in private, and the agreement among the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom and Egypt on the Security Council issue in 1956, discussing the issue in private in the office of the Secretary-General.

evolve general principles as to the conditions under which negotiation has been successful and can be successful?

II. Asian History and Peaceful Attitudes

Is Asia basically more inclined towards peace than conflict, asks Rusett, and if the answer is in the affirmative, can her history and experience be explored for help in achieving the common goal of maintaining international peace without armaments and military alliances? The present writer has only two comments to make.

First, the tendency among statesmen and writers in international politics to regard Asia as one unit only leads to confused thinking, unless the purposes for which Asia can be considered as a unit are clearly indicated. It is obvious, for instance, that geographical Asia has, in respect of political opinion, at least three clear groupings—the Communist, the pro-West and the uncommitted. It is also clearly unscientific to regard the history of Asia as symbolising one undifferentiated pattern applicable to all the countries of Asia—for Asian countries just as for instance, European countries, have had their own history and experiences, distinguishable one from another. Asian countries have developed their traditions and way of life under the impact of at least three civilizations, the Hindu, the Chinese and the Semitic ; and the countries which came under the impact of each of these exhibit similarities, but to talk of *Asian* history and experience is not helpful. It is true that most Asian countries, with the exception of Japan and Thailand, having been under foreign domination during the last three centuries, have developed some common attitudes clearly traceable to that basic fact, such as their attitude towards colonialism and racialism and their unwillingness to be treated as pawns on the chessboard of Western power politics, and it is from this angle that during the last two decades statesmen from Asian countries have treated Asia as a unit, but to go beyond that and to treat Asia as having one common history and tradition, would, I suggest, be unhistorical.

Second, such evidence as is available does not substantiate the views cited by Rusett that Asian countries have been more inclined towards peace than conflict. It is only necessary to cite the authority of Quincy Wright, the noted historian of war, in this connection. From the data collected by him,¹ it will be clear that Asian countries as such are not more inclined towards peace than conflict ; the evidence rather, points to the fact that peaceful attitudes and warlike attitudes are equally found among people of different civilisations, irrespective of continental affiliations.

¹Quincy Wright, *The Study of War*, Vol. II, Table 17.

SOME PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF ARTICLE 2 (7).

MICHAEL AARONSON

The purpose of this Article is to discuss some procedural aspects of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter of the United Nations. However, as the wind of change steadily blows throughout the world it may be appropriate first to draw attention to the record of the discussions of the 1200 amendments to the original Proposals, most of which are contained in the minutes and reports of the Sub-Committees, Committees, Commissions and Plenary Sessions of the San Francisco Conference¹ which constitute the preparatory work that led to the unanimous adoption of the Charter of the United Nations by the representatives of fifty States in Plenary Session without any reservations.²

A provision of the draft Charter which caused much discussion at the San Francisco Conference and which was the subject of an Australian amendment, ultimately adopted, was the domestic jurisdiction clause finally expressed as Article 2 (7) of the Charter in the following terms :

“ Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter VII ”.

It is clear from the records of the San Francisco Conference that Article 2 (7) was designed to ensure that the United Nations should not go beyond acceptable limits in determining the scope of its functions. Furthermore, it is apparent that participating States considered that, insofar as the organs of the United Nations are concerned, the appropriate rule of international law was to be the criterion governing matters that fall within the scope of domestic jurisdiction, though the limitation does not apply to enforcement measures under Chapter VII. It is also abundantly clear from those records that, so far as settlement of disputes by the International Court of Justice is concerned, the Court's jurisdiction, as stated in its Statute, is rigidly governed by the existing rules of international law.

The rule of international law governing domestic jurisdiction has been defined in the following terms.

“ It is a recognised principle of international law that over a wide range of their responsibilities, national States are immune from outside interference. The way in which a nation frames

¹See U.N.C.I.O. Documents.

²See Misc. No. 9 (1945) Cmd. 6666 ; also U.N.C.I.O. Documents Vol. I p. 631.

its political constitution ; the division of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial organs of the State ; the principles and methods of public administration ; the regulation of the relationship between the citizen and his government ; questions of economic, social and cultural policy—all these are commonly regarded as matters of national, not of international concern. Freedom of action in these spheres has always been jealously guarded by national governments and consistently admitted by international law”.³

Much has been written and argued as to the meaning and implications of the terms of Article 2 (7). It is generally conceded that the United Nations may intervene in matters normally regarded as essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, provided such intervention complies with enforcement measures governed by the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter. However, the controversy concerning the rights of the United Nations under the terms of Article 2 (7) arises in the absence of enforcement measures, where it is maintained that discussion of matters normally falling within the scope of domestic jurisdiction constitutes intervention.

It is clear from the records of the San Francisco Conference that the general attitude, particularly on the part of the smaller States, was that Members should be left to manage their own affairs within their own territories. While it was considered desirable to strengthen the position of the Security Council, should a situation requiring enforcement measures arise, most participating States felt that, in an orderly world, discussion by the United Nations of matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State constituted intervention and should be prohibited. In fact, Article 2 (7) as finally drafted was principally designed to protect the interests of smaller States. It was accepted that Member States had problems within their own territories which they preferred to solve at their national levels without discussion of those problems in the relevant organs of the United Nations.

Though the General Assembly has decided that it is master of its own procedure one may detect that it remains influenced by these basic premises. It is true that the General Assembly regards itself as competent to include any item on its agenda by a majority vote. Nevertheless, the General Assembly is careful to ensure that, where the provisions of Article 2 (7) apply, the matter can only be included on its agenda if it has some international aspects.⁴ In the case of Cyprus the United Kingdom delegate indicated that there were international aspects to the problem. For that reason he expressed the readiness of the United Kingdom to discuss that matter at the international level in the General Assembly. At the same time he entered the *caveat* that matters within Cyprus which fell exclusively

³See Bentwich and Martin, *A Commentary on the Charter of U.N.* 1950 p. 15.

⁴See Statement by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd at 12th Session of G.A. in General Committee Meeting 111.

within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, were not matters for international discussion.⁵ This was accepted by the General Assembly.

An interesting practical example of the care exercised by the United Nations in dealing with matters where, though the question of domestic jurisdiction applies there exist international aspects, can be seen in the approach to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force.⁶ The matter preceding the establishment of U.N.E.F. had come before the Security Council under the terms of Article VI of the Charter and the question of enforcement measures did not arise. Nevertheless, the matter was transferred to the General Assembly under the terms of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution⁷ and the General Assembly was responsible for establishing U.N.E.F. Since enforcement measures under Article VII did not apply, U.N.E.F. was limited in its operations to the extent that consent of the Governments of the countries concerned was required before the Assembly could request the Force to be stationed or to operate on the territories of those countries.⁸ The Force has no rights other than those necessary for the execution of the functions assigned to it by the General Assembly and agreed to by the States concerned.⁹ If, therefore, a matter were to arise in the territories of those countries which, so far as the United Nations is concerned, is governed by the terms of Article 2 (7) the Force could not intervene and it is unlikely, in those circumstances, that the General Assembly would permit the matter to appear on its agenda for discussion. The fact that U.N.E.F. is stationed on the territory of those States, with the consent of the relevant governments, in order to perform a function for the General Assembly which those governments have agreed to permit, in no way cancels the terms of Article 2 (7) in respect of those States. Of course, if developments occurred in those States which normally would be regarded as falling within their domestic jurisdiction but which, nevertheless, had international aspects, those international aspects, in accordance with the precedents already established by the General Assembly, could be discussed by the United Nations.

Though much of the debate concerning the legality of discussing matters governed by the terms of Article 2 (7), which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, has taken place in the General Assembly, it is important to recall that the terms of Article 2 (7) apply to all organs of the United Nations. This includes the

⁵See Statement by Mr. Noble at 12th Session of G.A., First Committee, 927th Meeting, and 933rd Meeting. See also statement by Mr. Macmillan at 15th Session of G. A. Plenary Meeting 875, U.N. Doc. A/P.U.877, p. 38, 29 September, 1960.

⁶See Report of the Secretary General to 13th Session of G.A. Document A/3943.

⁷Resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950.

⁸See Document A/3943. See also remarks by Mr. Lester Pierson, Canadian House of Commons Debates, 29 November 1956.

⁹See Document A/3943 p. 10.

Security Council in those circumstances where the application of enforcement measures does not arise. The Lebanese question that came before the Security Council in 1958 is, therefore, of great procedural interest.

In the Lebanese question, as considered by the Security Council in the summer of 1958, there was a conflict between the constitutional President Mr. Chamoun, and a group of insurgents, among them Mr. Karame, later Prime Minister of the Republic.¹⁰ At first sight this might have appeared to be a case where the terms of Article 2 (7) could be said to apply. Nevertheless, the Government called for United Nations intervention on the grounds that a rebellion was fomented from abroad and supported actively by the introduction of volunteers and arms across the border.¹¹ As the Secretary General has indicated it was perfectly clear that the Security Council considered itself as being concerned solely with the possibility of intervention from outside to assist the rebels.¹² This gave the matter, which would normally have been governed by the terms of Article 2 (7), international aspects which enabled the Security Council to intervene in spite of the fact that enforcement measures were not involved. However, even though the request for intervention came from the Lebanese government the United Nations could only deal with the international aspects of the matter at the international level and could not intervene at the national level either on behalf of the Government or on behalf of the rebels.

The position as to the matter related to the Republic of the Congo is similar in some respects to that of the Lebanese question though different in others. It is similar, inasmuch as the internal differences in the Republic of the Congo are constitutional differences that, in normal circumstances, would have to be decided at the national level. It differs in the manner in which the situation came before the Security Council.

In this matter a request was addressed to the Secretary General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo for military assistance. The Secretary General considered the matter to be so serious that, in his opinion, there existed a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly he brought the matter to the attention of the Security Council under the terms of Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, which is the chief source of the Secretary General's political power. This power under Article 99 far exceeds the power granted to the Secretary General of the League of Nations who had only the right to call a

¹⁰See Second Report by the Secretary General *On The Implementation of Security Council Resolution S/4387* of 14 July 1960 and S/4405 of 22 July 1960, S/4417/Add.6.

¹¹*Ibid* p. 2.

¹²*Ibid*.

meeting when asked to do so by a Member.¹³ It is under the terms of Article 99 that the Security Council remains seized of the matter.

However, in spite of the fact that the Security Council is seized of the matter under the terms of Article 99 and, therefore, may be said to be considering the matter under the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter,¹⁴ the Security Council is not, at this stage, applying enforcement measures under that Chapter. Thus, the terms of Article 2 (7) apply and the United Nations may not intervene in matters at a national level which are essentially an internal constitutional dispute.¹⁵ Nor can its troops be used for any purpose other than to ensure the maintenance of law and order which is the international aspect of the matter to be dealt with at the international level. Any internal constitutional difficulties encountered by the Republic of the Congo are within the domestic jurisdiction of the Republic of the Congo and must be dealt with at the national level and are not matters for intervention by the United Nations unless, of course, such difficulties assume international aspects.

As to the civilian part of the United Nations operation in the Republic of the Congo the Secretary General has been enjoined by the terms of the Security Council's resolution to avail himself of the technical services of the Specialised Agencies. In addition he sees the need for experts of higher administrative experience "who must receive a new and so far untried status". The Secretary General relies upon Article 101 of the Charter for their appointment as members of the United Nations Secretariat and expects them to be used in an advisory capacity on such questions as the Government may wish to discuss. However, as the Secretary General points out, this does not mean that the experts get any responsibility or executive authority in relation to any activities within the Congolese administration. They merely form a panel on which the Government may draw for advice on specific questions as it might see fit.¹⁶ Thus, in this matter also the terms of Article 2 (7) of the Charter are being scrupulously applied by the United Nations.

Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Security Council became seized of this matter under the terms of Article 99 of the Charter it is apparent that the Security Council will continue to be seized of the matter for such time as the Secretary General considers that the international aspects of the matter constitute a threat to the peace. Indeed as he has already pointed out,

"The United Nations has put its resources at the disposal of the Republic of the Congo, because, in the form, and to the

¹³See Goodrich and Hambro, *Charter of the U.N.*, 1949, p. 502.

¹⁴See Second Report of the Secretary General S/4417/Add 5 11 August 1960.

¹⁵For the attitude of H.M. Government in the United Kingdom see *Hansard*, 11 July 981, 14 July 1602, 20 July 494. See also First Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo, Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, S/4531, p.6. para. 15, 21 September, 1960.

¹⁶See Second Report of the Secretary General, S/4417/Add 5, 11 August 1960.

extent, such a service to the Republic of the Congo serves the overriding purpose of maintaining international peace and security. That purpose was the basis for the decision of the Security Council and the further development of the United Nations activities will be determined by it.¹⁷

Thus, within the framework of the domestic jurisdiction provisions of Article 2 (7) the Secretary-General is, among other things, also empowered to apply such provisional measures as he may deem fit under the terms of Chapter VII Article 40 of the Charter, in order to prevent an aggravation of the matter. Such measures are without prejudice to the rights of the parties concerned. It is under the terms of Article 40 that the Secretary-General is empowered to take over, provisionally, the administration of military bases previously occupied by the Government of Belgium and to employ such technical staff as he deems appropriate in order to administer those bases.¹⁸ Similarly, under the terms of Article 40 the Secretary-General can assume temporary control of airports or other areas over which he considers temporary control by the United Nations will prevent an aggravation of the matter.

See 2nd Report of the Secretary-General S/4417/Add 8 Annex II.

¹⁸See 3rd Report of the Secretary-General, S/4475, 30 August 1960.

NEW THREATS TO BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC POSITION IN WEST ASIA, ADEN AND SOMALIA.

D. C. WATT

In 1960-61 the British position in west Asia seems likely to experience one of its severest tests since the war, comparable in intensity with those of Suez and Abadan but much more complex and far-reaching in its scope. The crisis to be expected will arise not so much from the simple and straightforward issue of local nationalisation of a major British asset, as at Suez or Abadan, but from the simultaneous eruption of trouble all along the fringes of the western Indian ocean, the Horn of Africa and the coasts of southern Arabia, in Somalia and Somaliland, in Aden and the protectorates, troubles added to those still unsettled in the interior of Oman.

The *raison d'être* of the British position in the western Indian ocean has changed considerably since 1945. Historically, the British position was established here to protect British commerce on the route to India from local piracy or the threat which would be posed by the establishment of bases by rival great powers; the affairs of the various British stations and political relations in the area as a whole were conducted by the government of British India. Aden itself was only transferred from the control of the government of Bombay to that of the Colonial Office in London in 1937.

Today the whole picture has changed radically. Great power threats to Suez and to the British position in the Red Sea which was a logical extension of British control of the Suez Canal, ended when Italy was defeated in 1943 and shorn of her possessions in Eritrea, Somalia and Abyssinia. The German threat ended at El Alamein in 1942. The French position in French Somaliland could never be regarded in any way as a threat to Britain. Differences between France and Britain in the Middle East arose not from a conflict of interests but from the effects of radically different colonial policies in neighbouring territories. Such embitterment as these differences engendered had little effect on the broad segments of French or British public opinion. It lived on only in the overheated imaginations of French and British administrators of Syrian or Palestinian experience.

There remained the possibility of Russian pressure, the main element in traditional British military thought on the Middle East. Historically, India had acted as the base for Britain's major strategic reserve. This threat could come from two directions, through the Dardanelles to the eastern Mediterranean or through Persia to the Gulf. Ultimately control of Suez and the establishment of a naval base in the eastern Mediterranean could take care of the first. The Indian army would counter the second. In the 1920's

and 1930's, when Russia no longer threatened as an enemy, but Japan did, Suez assumed an added importance as a way-station to Singapore, the naval base from which threats to Britain's Far Eastern position were to be countered by a transfer of the British main fleet from its bases in home and Mediterranean waters.

The withdrawal of British forces from India in 1947 completely removed the traditional military element in British strategic thought. With no base in India and no strategic reserve there, the need to protect the route to India *as such* vanished overnight. With this one would also have expected British tenderness for Persia and the Gulf to vanish also, but for the immense increase in middle eastern oil production after 1950. Besides Persia, this oil came primarily from five sources, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Britain felt in no way responsible for the defence of this last. But Iraq stood as an ally, at least until July 1958. Kuwait, Bahrein and Qatar all stood in some measure under British protection. The protectorate treaties in fact long ante-dated the discovery of oil. They dealt in the main with protection by sea from piracy or local aggression. Similar treaties existed with the little states of Trucial Oman. The Sultan of Muscat and Oman remained in commercial relations with Britain but little else. Under the influence of this vast growth in oil production, the British government came to conceive their responsibility for protection in new terms, to cover the uncertain land frontiers and to maintain internal stability and the political *status quo*. Thus they intervened to protect what were claimed to be interests of Abu Dhabi and Oman in the Buraimi Oasis against Saudi Arabia. They aided the Sultan of Muscat and Oman against the so-called Imam of Oman's attempt to assert a separate sovereignty over the interior. At the request of the Sheikh of Bahrein they arrested and lodged on St. Helena a number of malcontent Bahreinis. And they staged a small scale naval demonstration when trouble was believed to threaten in Qatar.

These considerations allied with the traditional fears of a Russian break-through into the eastern Mediterranean to lead British military and naval thinking to stress the need for a major base in the Middle East, if possible at Suez. But when Egyptian pressure led to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, and the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez base, the two sets of considerations led in opposite directions. Fears of Russian threats on the eastern Mediterranean led to the selection of Cyprus as a new base. The need to watch over the Gulf protectorates led, after three years of confusion crowned by the Suez operation, to the setting up in November 1957 of a separate Middle Eastern command based on Aden, commanding land and air forces in the Arabian Peninsula and on the Horn of Africa, and naval forces in the Gulf. An element of the strategic reserve was stationed in Kenya, where it could be called on in need either to go to Aden or across the Indian ocean to Singapore.

This last showed the way in which the older considerations of British Far Eastern policy still operated on the British position in the western Indian ocean. It was no longer the route to India that mattered, but the route to South East Asia, where Britain had obligations to Malaya and Singapore, and was a member also of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation. The threat no longer came from Japanese sea-power but from Chinese subversion. It was to be met not by the transfer of battleships but by the rapid air lift of light armed infantry units, or the dispatch of short-ranged jet aircraft. The air route was more flexible, lying either through Turkey, Iran, the Gulf, the Maldives, Colombo, Singapore, or southwards through Libya, Khartum, Aden on to the Maldives. The centre could not be flown over without the permission of Egypt or Syria, permission unlikely to be easily given.

The position took on an extra importance if some of the more grandiose schemes mooted for Egyptian expansion were taken seriously. At the moment they were being contained by what was coming to be known informally as the "Southern tier", of the Sudan and Abyssinia. Such schemes were not to be lightly dismissed when first conceived. The prospect of Egyptian influence lying just across the border of Kenya or Uganda, at a time when inter-racial troubles were at their trickiest was not one that Britain could dismiss lightly. Kenya's difficulties were bad enough without constant exploitation of them by Britain's enemies.

This is the position now so seriously threatened. The threat comes essentially from three sides ; from Yemeni pressure on Aden's borders, from developments inside Aden itself and from Somali-Abyssinian hostility arising out of the achievement of Somali independence in 1960. The first of these threats is the most irritating to Britain and has so far made the most headlines. Essentially, however, it is of the least importance. The Yemeni ruler, the aged Imam, and his family claim that Aden and the Aden protectorates are part of the Yemen, the "South Yemen" as they call it in their propaganda literature. The bases of their claims are twofold ; in law, they base them on a period of Yemeni dominance over all South Arabia in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries ; a dominance against which the tribes of the Aden protectorate revolted and achieved a factual independence before the British arrival in Aden itself. In contemporary terms they can always call on a certain number of dissident tribal leaders from the Protectorate who have taken refuge in Sana¹, and they can count on inter-tribal fears on the Aden-Yemeni frontier to secure that all will take their rifles and act against the tribal leaders of the Aden protectorate.

But the Yemeni position is essentially a weak one. The most that tribal pressure can secure is the interruption of the old overland

¹Many of these recently (August 1960) were reported to have returned to Aden and made their peace with their legitimate rulers.

trading routes and the imposition on Britain of a continuous military commitment. At best it is an irritant, no more. Moreover, the Adeni tribes weary of anarchy. Yemeni pressure has succeeded where years of British advice had failed, and led the local rulers of the western Protectorate gradually to settle their differences and combine together in a Federation. Thus the feudal theocrats of the Yemen are precluded by their own mediaevalism from attacking effectively. Effectively to appeal to the local opposition, to the tribal leaders of the Aden Protectorate, the Yemen must itself be modernised and transformed into a new style nationalist state, a process for which it lacks both the social and the economic prerequisites. The alternative to theocratic absolutism in the Yemen is not Arab nationalism but anarchy. Even had the Crown Prince Badr succeeded in ousting his father's adherents in the summer of 1959, he would have been forced to employ the same methods of rule as his father or see the Shafei tribes revolt against Zaidi rule and retreat into inter-tribal anarchy.

It is in Aden itself that Arab nationalism really threatens, the more so as the British government is committed to developing Aden towards self government. So far the extreme nationalists, organised in two parties, the United National Front and the South Arabian League, have much eased the British task by boycotting the election of 1955 and 1958 to the Legislative Council which has had since December 1958 a majority of elected members. But the next elections, in 1962, may be a different matter. The motives impelling them to this boycott stemmed in part at least from the measures taken by the British government to define the electorate, a supremely difficult task in a city where there is so much migrant labour as Aden. Much of this migrant population is Yemeni in origin, and it is among these that the Arab trades unions have found their strongest footing. These last have grown immensely in number and strength since the first trades union, the Aden Port Pilots Association, was set up in 1952. There are now about 30 unions organised in a Trades Union Council, under an able Adeni who is also a violent nationalist, named Al Aznaq, with its own newspaper, *El Amal*. Like the political parties, the trades unions are intransigently nationalist and averse to co-operation in the Adeni government. They withdrew from government committees in 1957, boycotted the 1958 elections and have organised at least two large scale strikes which spilled over into violence, riots and bomb throwing. The then Assistant General Secretary of the Aden T.U.C. was jailed for subversive activities in 1958 after the riots. The strongest unions, the Aden Petroleum Refinery Limited Employees Union, and the British Petroleum (Aden) Employees Union, revealed in their most recent strike in November 1959 a complete disregard for the damage their strike was doing to Aden as a whole, even to the extent of driving British Petroleum and the shipping companies which

rely greatly on Aden's oil bunkering facilities to divert ships to Djibuti instead.

The development of Arab nationalism in Aden strikes at the British position therefore in two ways. In damaging Aden economically it lessens the immense economic advantages Aden confers on British shipping. Secondly, it threatens Britain with the development of a political majority in Aden no longer willing to stay within the Commonwealth or tolerate the use of Aden as a British base or a British-owned bunkering station. Such a majority would certainly be Nasserist and pro-Egyptian. Of the two Arab radios, Sana and Cairo, the latter though more distant is infinitely more effective than the former. The main drag on the progress of the nationalists has been a lack of leadership, and rivalry between those who felt that it should devolve on them. The main encouragement comes whenever there is any faltering in British control or obvious division of counsel in Britain itself. No moderate wishes to be caught on the wrong side if there is any likelihood of a British withdrawal. At the moment the British position has remained firm and calm. Local proconsuls have even dreamed of a Southern Arabia united around Aden as a member of the Commonwealth. But officially, the only British commitment is in a further advance towards internal self-government. How successful they will be in halting the tide of Arab nationalism at that point remains to be seen. But success is unlikely to be achieved without the kind of struggle which fits so easily among the stereotyped images of anti-colonialism.

The third and greatest threat comes from Somali-Ethiopian conflict. A hostile Somalia outflanks the British position in Aden and lies athwart the route by which Aden can be reinforced by Kenya. Its position across the Horn of Africa similarly threatens the trade routes up the Red Sea. It borders onto Kenya and threatens to exacerbate the strains which any rational settlement of Kenya's multi-racial problems must overcome. Moreover it is difficult to see how an open Somali-Abyssinian conflict is to be avoided.

Somali nationalism is essentially linguistic and tribal. In all there are about 2,300,000 Somalis, of which 600,000 are in the former British Somaliland, 1,300,000 in the former Italian Somalia, 400,000 in Abyssinia, 56,000 in Kenya, and 27,000 in French Somaliland. The language itself is a rich tongue, with a very wide vocabulary and a very considerable oral literature. There is no generally accepted orthography, but with a largely illiterate population, seven competing broadcasting stations, and an effective use of Somali poets as servants of party propaganda, the lack of easy written communication has in no way impeded the growth of linguistic nationalism. Of the five Somali inhabited areas, Somalia has already achieved independence and been joined by British Somaliland. In French Somaliland it has been made clear by

General de Gaulle that no question of independence as yet arises. Thus the new Somali state already includes 1,900,000 of the Somalis, with three made-to-measure *irredenta*. Of these far the most important is the area known in the north as the Haud, in the south as the Ogaden. The area was recognised as Abyssinian by the Anglo-Abyssinian treaty of 1897 ; but it was at no time under effective Abyssinian administration until 1958. From 1900-1921 it was the base from which the Somali national hero, leader of the Salafiva *tariqa*, Ibn Abdullah Hassan, the " Mad Mullah ", conducted with Abyssinian support, (the Negus was then a Moslem) his campaigns against British and Italian rule. In 1936 it passed under Italian rule ; in 1941 this was succeeded by British military administration. Only in 1954 was the 1897 treaty reaffirmed and the area handed back, over vociferous Somali protest, (a delegation was sent to the U.N.), to Abyssinia. Figures for Somalia are difficult to come by, but about half the population of former British Somaliland being nomadic pastoralists of camels, sheep and goats, follow the rainfall into the Haud for six to nine months a year. Despite an Anglo-Abyssinian agreement and the work of British liaison officers with the tribes, there have been frequent clashes in which the superior organisation and armament of the Abyssinian military have scored heavily. The government of Abyssinia views the Somalis with the deepest suspicion ; and the periodic irruptions of such large numbers of nomadic tribesmen, whose fighting abilities are legendary, across their most sensitive frontier is difficult to fit into the categories of western legal thought on frontiers which the Abyssinians equate with civilisation. They have therefore been organising the Somali chieftains of the area in demonstrations of loyalty to the Negus. They have exerted a great deal of pressure on nomadic Somalis to own Abyssinian nationality. And they have encouraged a pro-Abyssinian party in the Somali elections, the H.D.M.S., which draws its main strength from the 250,000 Rashewain speakers lying north of the Juba river in Somalia whom the Somalis regard and treat as sub-standard. This won some 34% of the votes cast in the last election in Somalia.

The Abyssinians have good reason to be alarmed. The Ogaden is in fact the heartland of Somali literature, the cultural homeland of all Somalis. If that were not enough, the Greater Somali League under the pro-Nasserite Haj Muhammed Husein, a break away group from the dominant Somali Youth League, uses the 5-pointed star as its electoral emblem, each point representing a Somali province, the Ogaden being one of them. Still worse from the Ethiopian point of view, Somali extremists have begun to claim that the Galla tribes of Ethiopia proper are also Somalis. There have been Somali broadcasts to these Galla, and indeed Galla is far more akin to Somali, to which it relates rather as Dutch to German, than to Amharic or Danaquil. Moreover, Islam has been spreading among the Galla with links into the Somali *tariqas*, a portent which

the Christian Amharic-speaking ruling class of Abyssinia view with the utmost distaste. As a result they have been driven to claim the whole Horn of Africa as their own. They have commented outspokenly on "Moslem encirclement"; and have come to regard the whole Somali problem as a sinister Anglo-American plot against them. As a race they are naturally isolationist, xenophobic, suspicious to the point of paranoia and given to seeing plots under every bush. And in their actions against Somali tribesmen their local commanders have shown an increasing disposition to resort to indiscriminate violence; all of which is commented on and disseminated in Mogadishu and Hergeisa, where a sizeable refugee community is growing. One at least of the political leaders in British Somaliland is a refugee from the Ogaden.

The position is an extremely difficult one for the West. The Abyssinian case is clear in international law, though clearly not based on the right to "self-determination". Somali irredentism is strong, yet Somalia is not economically viable, as a World Bank Report made clear in 1957. The present leaders, Andullahi Issa and Aden Abdullah Osman, Ahmed Hassan and Michael Mariano are pro-British and pro-western. But in both territories, there are well-organised extremist parties which are not. The Soviets are already beginning to express an interest in the area. Cairo radio broadcasts at length in Somali and maintains links with both extremist groups. The West cannot afford a Somali-Abyssinian conflict. It cannot see the Somalis turn to Cairo or to Moscow; nor would it welcome another Russian mission to Addis Ababa. The pro-Somali group in Britain is strong and well-organised: again it has on its fringes dreamers who would like to see a Somali state as a new member of the Commonwealth. The dream itself is unreal and unimportant, but it makes a cogent appeal to Conservatives today in the penumbral shades of an Empire to whose transformation into an association of equals they may be intellectually but are far from emotionally reconciled.

But the primary British interest here is again strategic. The British position is everywhere so tenuous and the consequences of loss seem to loom so large in terms of an upheaval in the Gulf and Aden that there could very well be the kind of repercussions on the Atlantic Alliance which Abadan and Suez brought with them. What is at stake for Britain is not merely the remnants of a historical position, important though this is to British emotions. It is a strategic position which is an important buttress to C.E.N.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O., and a barrier behind which Central Africa may still solve its troubles unhindered by international pressures; an economic position which is an extremely important buttress to the whole structure of Britain's economy, of sterling and of world trade; and a political position where Britain is genuinely trying to introduce stable, viable and efficient self-government in an area where few independent states are notable for any of these virtues.

TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL THEORY

A Commentary.

ALAN COLLINGRIDGE

I have been invited to comment on three articles in the April issue of this Journal by Professor C. A. W. Manning, Martin Wight and Alan de Russett, and I can imagine no task more fascinating, stimulating or tantalising.

I am convinced that the topic with which they deal is the most important in the world today ; that we are overdue for a revolution in our approach to it ; and that the causes of the difficulties, of which the writers show themselves so acutely aware, lie very deep in the ideas of our civilisation. With the whole world to deal with in a short space, I must leave the bearing on the three articles of such ideas as I put forward to be seen often by implication rather than by direct reference. In particular, the techniques of teaching dealt with by Alan de Russett would need a later article by itself.

I approach this study by a somewhat unorthodox path, and should first present my credentials. Mine was the Oxford of Evelyn Waugh's "Brideshead Revisited", of the immediate post 1914-18 war period when all of us had either fought in World War I or had, like myself, expected to. I have always considered that we were a deeply serious, indeed religious, generation, and our outward scepticism and disillusion was an expression rather than a contradiction of this. We strenuously hoped that we should be able to prevent another world war, and it could be said that our main quest since the age of eighteen was to find a means of doing so. I was among the little group that about 1922 founded the Oxford International Assembly, the first, I believe, of its kind anywhere. But the imperfections of the League of Nations, and the shortcomings of the political philosophy associated with it, were too evident for it to hold our faith completely. So some of us turned our attention to making a close and detailed study of what seemed to be the most immediately difficult and dangerous of current international relations, those with Germany, only to find the crass ineptitudes on which the appeasement policy was based soon compromised and made ineffectual all serious attempts to discover and deal with the true points of conflict between Germany and her former enemies. To those of us who were constantly engaged, in the dozen years preceding 1939, jointly with our young German contemporaries in a series of vigorous and socially creative agricultural, musical and dramatic camps, tours and summer schools, it seemed self-evident that, as between England and Germany, each country held the clue to the shortcomings of the other, and that healing and fresh growth could be born precisely out of our national differences. But, in the event, we had to watch with consternation the political leaders contriving to bring the various

national elements together in what seemed just the wrong way, causing irritation by being stiff on points where they could have afforded to be conciliatory, and yielding on points where the deep, unconscious national temper would never, in fact, acquiesce in conceding anything at all. There was nothing surprising in the outbreak of 1939. Lack of understanding and shallowness of thought had produced, unnecessarily, an explosive mixture which our European society could find no means of controlling.

This preliminary note of the *via dolorosa* of one section of my generation serves to point three morals. The two that I have just mentioned—that there has been lack of understanding of each other by the nations involved, and shallowness of thought among the students and practitioners of politics ; and one other, borne slowly and gradually in upon the mind—that the fatal defect in our civilisation must be located not among the worst but among the best elements of our thought and our society. For it was not merely that the current leadership of the nations was deficient : there was also no other better set of ideas effectively available. If it were just that the bad men were wrong, we could have dealt with it. But it was the best efforts of the best men that were frustrated and overborne. The simplest and most vivid illustration of this is given by a contemplation of the “wicked man” theory—that the main reason for the outbreak of war was that there was a wicked man called Adolf Hitler. The theory is constantly and almost universally asserted, but the fearful implications of it are hardly ever seen or mentioned—that we had between the wars a civilisation that was vulnerable to one wicked man, or, at any rate, to influences adjudged weak or wicked. If we recognise such an element as wickedness, surely the whole point of a political society is that it should be able to deal with it by some technique short of war. It is there to do precisely that. And there can be no satisfactory conception of “goodness” in a society which cannot control “wickedness”. No responsible thinker can ride away on the “wicked man” theory. The breakdown was that of our civilisation as a whole.

We have not yet absorbed the full lesson expressed in the great words of John Donne, which of course apply to spiritual as well as to physical death : “Who bends not his ear to any bell, which upon any occasion rings ? But who can remove it from that bell, which is passing a piece of himself out of this world ? No man is an island, entire of itself ; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main ; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friends’ or of thine own were. Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind. And therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls ; it tolls for thee.”

In all our League of Nations days we were thinking “If only we could ensure that more strength and effort could be put behind the ‘good’ ideas, so that they should prevail over the ‘bad’”,

allowing insufficiently for the fact that the "bad" of one nation may be the "good" of another and that, cosmically, the gods were looking down on the classic conflict of all tragedy, that between one "good" and another "good". Very probably as much as possible was done in the few years available. The peoples of the world had not realised how profound a spiritual effort of self-adjustment to unfamiliar foreign ideas was necessary if a world conflict was to be averted.

I have for years watched with admiration, as who has not, the gallant and almost lone championship by Professor Manning of the study of international relations as a separate discipline. When critics have said that it is in fact only a section of history, or of philosophy, they really reveal the limitations of what we know as history and philosophy : for the *task* of the study of international relations is not wafted away by their critical denial of its existence. It can be far more strongly asserted that *there is no other study*. Why do we not see this ? The reason, I believe, is that there is a fundamental defect in the structure of our philosophical thinking which we are unwilling to recognise and acknowledge, even though we are becoming increasingly aware that it will be at our peril that we fail to correct it. For this is a topic on which there *must* be an answer, and a bad one will be found and propagated if no good one is evolved. In this connection the value of Martin Wight's exhaustive analytical account of the condition of international theory is beyond price. His review, covering the centuries, gives an absolutely firm starting point for the next necessary step. He shows us with the utmost detail and precision how far we have got ; we have got *nowhere*.

To return to the three defects I mentioned ; mistakes have occurred in international relations because of a lack of understanding—the views and feelings of the other country were simply not understood ; or, because of shallowness of thought, the full chain of cause and effect was not followed out ; or because we could not see that the "best" as we saw it was not automatically the "best" for the other contending party. But these can also be dealt with as one single defect—an inadequate sense of responsibility. I remember vividly how, in the agonising intensity of war service, when one's mind stripped everything down to the bare and most urgent essentials, all my thinking on this subject resolved itself into one single and sufficient idea, that there would be no difficulties that we could not cope with, provided we could fulfil the simple condition of thinking with an enhanced sense of responsibility. Opposing standpoints were not in themselves dangerous ; the one thing to fear was superficiality. There might be little need to fear any views that leaders hold, provided only that they would recognise exactly what they involved and would think them through to their final consequences. No doubt it is far beyond the power of most of us to do this, but it is still the formula to follow. This is true, apart from the fact that

the full practice of responsibility includes—I think it could be shown that it must include—the conception that when one injures another one injures oneself. And I think that it is more likely than not to be true that if a man (or a nation) knew that something he was about to do would cause injury, he would not do it. What makes us normally reluctant to believe this is our lazy habit of thinking which makes us assume bad motives in those whose actions we dislike. It is relatively easy to find what we believe to be the solution to a dispute if we allot bad motives to our opponent. But this merely diverts our attention from the real problem underlying the dispute. For we ought, surely, always to try to find the solution after assuming good motives in the opponent. Then, but then alone, we have to meet the full rigour of the problem. Have we not all schoolday memories of the mathematical problem we find too difficult, so that we are tempted to believe there must be a mistake in the question? I suggest that an international political problem which can only be solved by assuming an evil motive is a problem which simply has not been probed to its depths.

Let me now bring to a sharper focus some of the ideas underlying this commentary. The reason why there is no international theory is that writers who have attempted to evolve one have always tried to do so in terms of the known ideas and ideals of their own civilisation; whereas the whole point of international problems is that by definition they are always concerned with the *terra incognita* of another nation or culture. And the would-be international theorists have failed to do the one thing required of them—evolve a philosophy for dealing with the unknown. For they will always be dealing with the unknown. They have not evolved any answers because they have not known what question to pose.

It is probably a common experience, when meeting the problems of everyday life, that if one persists in trying to see them as simple, they are difficult to solve, and create great worry; but as soon as their full complexity is recognised, they become much easier to solve, and can be tackled with serenity. For it is not the size of our problems that daunts us, but an inability to understand their nature.

In the same way, in Political Science today, both national and international, the first necessity is not to be afraid of recognising the immense complexity of our problems. We must first accept that we shall make very little headway until, for instance, we have, on the academic side, found a way of combining the lessons which philosophy and history have to teach; or in the sphere of observation and experience, evolved a technique of making a fruitful analysis of our travel and contacts—personal, literary, artistic—with different sections of our own nation, or with foreigners. That much at least is obviously necessary, complicated though it is. But we live at a moment when we are conscious of the inadequacy of all our different systems of philosophy. The study of History,

too, is going through a revolution—a very fruitful one, thanks to the late Sir Lewis Namier and his followers—the end of which cannot yet be seen.

(Besides this again, I myself believe that all the humane studies will have much to learn from the disciplines of logic, mathematics and science. Professor Michael Polanyi has reminded us that natural science is part of the tradition of the humanities—the man with the test tube is only an artisan acting under the scientist's intellectual direction—and that the present artificial separation of the humanities and technology is a new and harmful development. I strongly suspect that when the discoveries even of mathematics are stripped of their technicalities, and their essential nature is described, they will be found to hold lessons for students of human behaviour ; and that these will be of especial value in just such spheres as international relations, where we are dealing with phenomena unknown to us from any previous experience.)

Much of the immense work that lies before us can probably be done within the framework of existing faculties and endowments. Post-graduate research, for instance, can be guided in the directions required by such new ideas as are evolved. Among the essential additions would be work along the lines pioneered by Geoffrey Gorer, whose studies of the Russians, the Americans, the Japanese and the Africans have shown what imaginative analysis can do in the field of comparative culture.

But there is one proviso, indicated by the holders of the chairs of Political Science at Oxford and Cambridge. New appointments were made to these at about the same time, some 15 years ago ; and in the inaugural lecture of each, complaint was made that the terms of reference of the Chair gave far too restricted an opportunity to develop this vitally important study properly. Such fetters will have to be removed.

Possibly one of the most urgent tasks awaiting political scientists is to find out the nature of a community. The contribution of Jung should be of some help here. War as a social event, and the different role played by warfare each time it breaks out, would then, for instance, be among the topics that could be fruitfully tackled, once we have found out what a community is, and such matters as to what extent religion is an essential part of the structure of a community. This in turn would give us a new start in studying what are the fundamental characteristics of religion, and what determines its development in different forms. We might well find that many apparently insoluble theological problems are really historical or social in nature ; and the present awkward relation between dogma, mysticism and ethics might be a little clarified and eased.

For we must recognise that we have a long way to go before we have true self-knowledge of our own community. It is presumably

impossible ever to attain it. One can either be or know, never both. But the condition of progress is that we should try to know. It is perhaps the measure of community self-knowledge that determines our rate of change, and our growth towards international understanding ; and we might discover here a precept—one of many of a kind we shall certainly need—that a failure to achieve such national self-knowledge automatically brings all international growth to a standstill

How much work, for instance, we may ask, has been done on examining the nature of what is understood as crime in a given community ? How far have political scientists followed up the pregnant suggestion of the great Belgian philosopher and legislator, Quetelet : “ *La société renferme en elle les germes de tous les crimes qui vont se commettre. . . . Tout état social suppose un certain nombre et un certain ordre de crimes qui résultent comme conséquences nécessaires de son organisation.* ”

As we pass from national to international political science we enter a sphere at once more difficult and more fruitful. The severer burden borne by international studies should lead to the discovery of valuable lessons for the national sphere, just as the performance of a racing car is said to help improve the design of an ordinary car. Intellectual shortcomings which do no more than cause confusion in the smaller sphere, create a complete hold-up in the larger. For instance, it may probably be alleged as one of the principal weaknesses of present-day philosophy that it attempts to describe a *state of things* when it should be describing a *process of growth*. For what provision do our philosophers make for the phenomena of change and growth ? There is a deadlock between two points of view ; and later the two protagonists are reconciled. What have they to tell us about what has happened in between ?

Philosophy in every age has had to deal with the problem of language ; it has always, of course, been accepted that the words used are only labels for the entity itself. But certain of the big main categories have been too much taken for granted and much too little questioned, and I believe that we have now reached a point in history when we have to recognise that the whole of our thinking is bedevilled by the tyranny of our own clichés of thought. Far too much of our discussion is content not to go beyond the currency of such words as “ thought ”, “ emotion ”, “ war ”, “ peace ” and so on, and we fail to think in terms of the entities for which they stand. A specific case that concerns us specially is the word “ nation ”. When we use it, at the best we assume it means something particular. But does it ? I suggest that it has no meaning except in a sense which prevents its being of use to students of international affairs. For every nation is different, and the differences are of the very essence of the matter. You can say that a zoologist deals with animals ; but no one would go to him and expect him to answer questions about the characteristics

and habits of "animals". "What animals?" he would, of course, ask, "they are all different." We try to evolve principles about the behaviour of nations before examining what they are; whereas the principles should be deduced from the results of prior experimental observation.

Russia and Italy, for instance, are not only different varieties of a type, they are different types of things. And it is precisely from the examination of these differences that the study of international relations must spring. The uniqueness of the individual instances is the heart of the study; the big words are the *trivia*. There is an analogy in this with Bertrand Russell's comment on the age-old conundrum of the relation between mind and matter. He has explained that each is really a chain of events, and that mind and matter do not really exist as separate entities in the sense which has always been assumed in the conundrum. So we find we have begun by implanting a difficulty in the heart of our own title—"international"—for in the sense which is assumed, there are no such things as nations. Among the consequences which follow from this is the fact that any idea which is valid within the framework of the thought of any one nation, cannot by definition be valid for that of another nation.

While discussing this a few days ago—during a Highland Ball in a romantic Scottish Castle on the bleak and beautiful North coast of the Isle of Mull—I was given an apt and topical instance of this problem of categories. I understand that R. P. Tempels has shown in "La philosophie Bantoue" (Desclée de Brouwer, Brussels) that great difficulties have arisen in trying to describe Western ideas to the Congolese because categories, which we use and assume to be the very axioms of thought and language, such as "religion", "science", etc., for them have no meaning at all. So that not even a start at communication along those lines can be made. How fascinating it would be, and how essential to discover what means they use for building up a picture of the world!

The things which need to be done to establish the study of international relations in the form required by the times do not need advocacy, for they will be compelled into existence by necessity. But we shall save much human suffering, and at the same time have the fascination of meeting an intellectual challenge of the highest interest, if we set about developing the study of international relations in the way our traditions of thought seem next to indicate.

BOOK REVIEWS

Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy. Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld. *New York: Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 35/-.*

The modern condition was recently described in conversation as the progressive inability of the human organism to deal with the implications of the environment which, at break-neck speed, it was creating for itself by the "magic" of applied science. This supposition might go far to explain the increasing neurosis, both individual and political, which is so outstanding a feature of our civilisation today. Our minds are rapidly ceasing to be able to digest the new facts and theories with which we are bombarded and we tend to deal with them by the simple method of ignoring them as being irrelevant to our daily lives.

Much of the underlying uncertainty and fear which ensues, is focused on the growth of the power of missiles and the accompanying entry into outer space, a region so far uncharted, ill-defined and offering both challenge and menace in almost equal proportions. We do not know how important it will prove to be, either in war or peace, and our existing legal concepts do not cover it. We have no guidance as to how best to control its use save by way of analogies whose application is doubtful. But since we cannot exorcise the genie we have raised, we must willy-nilly learn to live with it, and this excellent survey sets out the problems involved and suggests possible ways of meeting some of them.

The first part of the book, *International Controls in Retrospect*, deals exhaustively with examples from the Anglo-French condominium of the New Hebrides to the neutralization of Spitzbergen, and covers the roles played by the mandate and trusteeship systems and by functional organisations such as I.T.U., I.C.A.O., W.H.O., and so on. Part II is devoted to Antarctica, which offers a much closer analogy since it is an area which is empty, largely uncharted, of uncertain legal status and unproved economic potentialities, and although a number of national claims have been staked, national activities are still at the level where agreed internationalisation of the territory should not prove to be insuperably difficult. It is, however, relevant to note that the recently negotiated Antarctic Treaty still awaits ratification by the majority of the States concerned.

Part III contains a comprehensive account of the solar system and of space, its physical characteristics as far as they are known, the uses military and civil to which it has been put, the legal controversies to which it has already given rise, the course of discussion on it in the United Nations and in disarmament negotiations and the possibilities of bringing it within the ambit of demilitarisation and international control. The three forms of control which the authors tentatively advance as offering the most hopeful approach are : that there should be a variant of the trusteeship system by which the space Powers should administer space as Administering Authorities under the United Nations ; that States, or groups of States, should administer space subject to the legislative power of the General Assembly over all technical, legal, governmental and security matters ; or that there should be direct supranational administration either through the United Nations, or through some especially created new body inside or outside its framework.

The difficulties ahead are formidable but the survey ends on a note of hope : "The experiences reviewed in this book show that through a long stretch of history states have evolved a variety of devices for co-operative and administrative activities.... The motivations have been as various as the forms—political, economic, technical, ideological, humanitarian. In recent years a still stronger motivation—human survival—has been added. The need and the incentive have never been greater than now. Steadily the trend on the face of the earth has been towards organised multinational activities in the common interest. There will be no reversal of that trend as man moves into outer space." To which it is only necessary to add the rider that what man does in space will

be a faithful reflection of what he does on earth—so far the verdict on his ultimate sanity remains in suspense.

Recognition in the Law of Nations. Satyavrata Patel. 1959. *N. M. Tripathi Private, Bombay. London : Sweet and Maxwell. 30/-.*

What immediately strikes and irritates the reader of this book is the lack of clarity in its exposition, deficiencies in its drafting and flaws in its logic, symptoms which taken together would seem to indicate an insufficient mastery of the subject matter, more particularly from the point of view of a strict theoretical analysis of its various aspects. All this is especially dangerous in a field such as this where in order to dissect the problems involved logically and in such a way as to lay bare their juridical anatomy the sharpness of a surgeon's scalpel is required. These criticisms could only be adequately substantiated by a series of quotations which would take up too much space and I will therefore confine myself to a few examples.

In his short introductory Chapter I on "the meaning of recognition" the writer without any previous discussion of the main problems jumps to conclusions by enunciating certain legal *a priori* propositions which logically he can only base upon the results of a careful analysis of all those problems. Already on page 2 he declares that : "The rights and attributes of sovereignty reside in a state as soon as it comes into factual existence and it may exercise them. . . . Therefore a full-fledged state may be perfectly within its rights . . . to demand from its brother states recognition as a distinct legal entity in the society of nations. . . . Of course (?), such a right to apply for recognition is not a legal one, which lays a corresponding duty on other states to give recognition". In the light of the first two sentences the reader cannot possibly understand why the right to apply for recognition, mentioned in the third sentence, should - and, at that, "of course"—not be a legal right. Moreover, this right to *apply* for recognition can certainly not be denied on the ground adduced that there is no corresponding duty to *accord* recognition. Apart from the fact that this is again an *a priori* conclusion from arguments which have still to be examined and weighed in the chapters which follow, the duty to *give* recognition is not the counterpart of a right to *apply* for recognition. From the logical point of view a correspondence of right and duty in this field can only consist in that a right to *apply for recognition* is paralleled by a duty to *consider the application*, or in that a *right to recognition* is paralleled by a *duty to recognise*.

And again on page 6 : "this (*viz.* recognition from other states) it (*viz.* the new state) can demand, for (?) it exists as a fact. But it is quite open for others to turn down the request, for there is no legal duty binding them to confer that status (?) on others. The right is moral without any co-relative duty on the existing states to respect it." Not even a co-relative moral duty?

And what the writer, in his following sentence on page 6, intends to convey by his statement that a new state "may be born . . . by secession of inhabitants from the portion of the territory of an existing state" is at first sight slightly problematic.

In these circumstances it is scarcely amazing that the whole argument leaves a muddled impression on the reader's mind. When for example, one comes across the introductory query on page 23, "whether the act of recognition is in its nature and essentially a legal act?" a somewhat hasty perusal might induce one to react immediately by answering : "That depends! a recognition may be legal, but it may also be illegal, for example if it is performed prematurely". However, when continuing to read and finding that the first query is followed by the words "or one that is political in its true aspect?", the reader is suddenly switched onto another track : the supposed qualification of recognition as a legal act must mean here its nature as a juridical act (or an act in law), as opposed to a political act, but then : (a) the two notions are not mutually exclusive—no one will, for example, deny that the conclusion of a treaty of alliance falls under both headings—and (b) recognition certainly is an act in law since it is intended

to produce and in actual fact produces legal effects. When resuming, the reader finally discovers that both tracks were wrong and that what the writer really wishes to discuss is whether, if the requisite conditions of "statehood" are fulfilled, recognition is a legally obligatory act. He denies this *de jure constituto* and on this point, in my view, he is right.

The foregoing objections make it sufficiently obvious that the contents of this book are not of a nature to help much in clarifying the subject. For the rest, it would be interesting to apply the author's, and other, theories to what is really happening in the world, for example in the chaotic situation in the Congo.

J. H. W. Verzijl.

International Law and the United Nations. Quincy Wright. *Asia Publishing House.* 28/6.

This short work is based on lectures given in 1956 at the Inter-American Academy of International and Comparative Law at Havana, Cuba, and revised and brought up to date after further lectures at the Indian School of International Studies in New Delhi in 1954-8.

The original object would seem to have been to consider the revision of the Charter of the U.N. as provided for after the lapse of ten years from the foundation of the Organisation. The work is as noteworthy for what it omits as for what it includes. Although it contains some valuable information and some wise judgements on the legal structure and working of the United Nations, there is very little consideration of the impact of the cold war and the consequent varying Soviet attitudes towards it. Little is said about the growing importance of the Secretary-General and his office, a development which has gone far beyond anything envisaged in the Charter. There is only a passing reference to Suez and Hungary and there is no substantial treatment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the section devoted to collective security.

Much that the lecturer says however, remains true. In the chapter on the interpretation of the Charter he points out that there lies the potentiality within the scope of its somewhat ambiguous articles of the Organisation becoming a world federation, a world empire (of the Great Powers) a mere affirmation of moral principles, an instrument of power politics or simply an international organisation with stated ends and machinery for the assumption of further obligations in the future. Professor Wright elaborates the last of these interpretations in succeeding chapters on "Domestic Jurisdiction and the Competence of United Nations Organs", "The Prevention of Aggression" and "The Development of the United Nations". The chapter on domestic jurisdiction gives a particularly lucid and balanced treatment of this most difficult and thorny subject. The author demonstrates that, contrary to what the foreign offices of the more sensitive countries often maintain, the concept of domestic jurisdiction is not static but has to submit to the steadily increasing expansion of international law. Whether his eminent colleagues would agree with him on this question is another matter.

Current Legal Problems 1960. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. *Stevens.* 50/-.

The latest volume of Current Legal Problems fully maintains the high standard set by its predecessors. All the contributions deal as usual with some topic of immediate interest falling within the province either of the academic or practising lawyer.

Amongst them are three which are of particular interest to students of international affairs, whether legally qualified or not. "From Air Law to Space Law" is a most stimulating discussion by Dr. Bin Cheng of the possibility of "extending to outer space principles and standards that have already gained wide acceptance in the sphere of aerial navigation". In the course of his lecture he discussed the vitally important topic of airspace sovereignty and the con-

sequences which will flow from a decision on the extent to which nations can claim such control over the space above their territories and how far the provisions of the Chicago Convention can be applied in the new situation. He comes to the general conclusion that although it would be wrong to suggest that "space law is but air law writ large" it should be possible to discover from present practice "a few historical pointers to order in outer space".

Dr. Green deals lucidly and fully with the vexed question of Gentlemen's Agreements and the Security Council, by which the non-permanent seats on the Council are filled according to a set of generally understood criteria which are nowhere precisely formulated ; a situation which can confidently be expected to give rise to yet more delicate problems as the membership of the Organisation swells. Dr. Schwarzenberger writes with his usual authority on the Law of International Institutions. As always what he has to say is extremely stimulating and should be widely pondered.

Other contributors are Professor Keeton on Some Problems in the Reform of the Law of Charities ; Mr. D. W. M. Waters on The Variation of Trusts ; Mr. S. Prevezer on Some Aspects of Receiving ; Mr. D. J. Payne on Compensating the Accident Victim ; Mr. G. J. Webber on Some Recent Developments in the Law of Master and Servant ; Mr. A. Goodman on The Law of Defamation and Freedom of Speech ; Mr. D. C. Holland on Emergency Legislation in the Commonwealth, still a subject considered as falling within the sphere of *inter se* rather than of international law proper presumably, Master I. H. Jacob on The Present Importance of Pleadings ; Mr. B. Hargrove on Revision of the Law relating to Mental Health and Mr. E. H. R. Ivamy on The Carriage of Goods by Sea. The collection is prefaced by the Address delivered to the Bentham Club by Professor J. L. Montrose ; "Return to Austin's College", in which he discusses with urbanity, wit and wisdom the question of the scope and content of legal education in the twentieth century.

Nuclear Weapons and International Law. Nagenda Singh. *London : Stevens for the Indian Council of World Affairs.* New Delhi. 35/-.

The author opens by a brief description of the effects of nuclear weapons and proceeds to set out the factors which distinguish them from conventional arms. He follows this with a general discussion of the nature and rules of the laws of war as found in international customary law and relevant multipartite treaties. He finds that while the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons are not in themselves prohibited, the use of such weapons, even by the United Nations taking preventive or enforcement measures against an aggressor, is illegal under international law, except as retaliation in kind. The case is argued at great length with a strong humanitarian bias, but he makes two damaging admissions which militate against the conclusions he wishes to draw. One is that nations now accept that the use of nuclear tactical or conventional weapons is proper and justified, indeed it might be difficult to find a prohibition of such use in accepted legal rules, though this might not apply to strategic nuclear weapons. And the second is his reservation that "there is, lastly, the extreme case of a victim of aggression using prohibited weapons when facing certain defeat, and after fully trying out conventional or permissible weapons. This could be conceded in so far as the law had to be upheld and the aggressive law-breaker was not to be encouraged by conceding him victory." Apart from the fact that this would vitiate whatever advantage could be gained by an outlawry of the use of nuclear weapons it would be endlessly contentious and would probably prove a singularly unreliable last resort in practice.

The United Nations Emergency Force. Basic Documents. A collection prepared by E. Lauterpacht. *Stevens for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.* Wrapper 10/- . Bound 15/-.

The Suez Canal Settlement. A Selection of Documents October 1956-March 1959. Edited by E. Lauterpacht. *London : Stevens, New York : Praeger,*

for the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. Wrapped 12/6. Bound 17/6.

These two compilations of relevant documents are quite invaluable to anyone dealing with the Suez incident. In this preface to the United Nations Emergency Force Mr. Lauterpacht is at pains to stress that he is dealing purely with the legal aspect of the establishment, operation and status of the Force and has omitted those documents which do not involve points of general legal interest. Nor has he made any attempt to deal with the question of the legality or otherwise of the setting up of U.N.E.F.

The Suez Canal Settlement is intended as a successor to "The Suez Canal – A Selection of Documents relating to the International Status of the Suez Canal Company", which appeared as a supplement to *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* in September 1956. The present collection is devoted to the principal documents of permanent legal interest bearing on the subsequent stages and development of the Suez Canal dispute. Both collections contain a very useful bibliography. It only remains to hope that Mr. Lauterpacht will perform the same invaluable service for the United Nations action in the Congo when the time is ripe. In the meantime we are much in his debt.

Tibet Disappears. Chanakaya Sen. *Asia Publishing House.* 48/-.

Tibet in Revolt. George N. Patterson. *Faber.* 21/-.

The Revolt in Tibet. Frank Moraes. *Macmillan Company.* New York. 10/6.

It was most remarkable that the world only heard of the revolt in Tibet when it was virtually over. The escape of the Tibetan God-King to India in conjunction with a rising in Lhasa, events impossible to hide, served to dramatise an insurrectionary situation which had been gathering strength for several years but which, by collusion between the Chinese and the Indian Governments, had been successfully concealed from the eyes of the world. For a few weeks the fate of this remote theocratic community held the centre of the world stage, as had Hungary. Outside intervention was equally impossible in both cases and as far as Tibet was concerned the fact that though it was recognised as the home of a distinctive people with a distinctive religion its exact status as a sovereign country was more obscure, was an additional obstacle.

Considerable information is now available as to what took place and the agreements and treaties about, or with, Tibet provide a framework for the story. These books together provide a clearer understanding of modern Tibet and its history.

Mr. Chanakaya Sen writes from the standpoint of an Indian commentator for whom "the consequence of the disappearance of Tibet on Sino-Indian relations has been traumatic". Once described by a British official as "the ideal buffer" for India on the north it has now virtually been absorbed into the political system of the Chinese Republic so that China has become India's immediate neighbour along a vast stretch of often badly delimited frontier. In order to show how this happened, and how frontier disputes have closely followed upon Chinese suppression of Tibet, the author has assembled a large collection of diplomatic documents, official statements and press comments bearing on Tibet beginning with a Chinese-Tibetan treaty of the eighth century and ending with a speech by Mr. Nehru in the Indian Parliament last September (1959). He has little personal knowledge of Tibet however and fails to explain how the former dependent relation of Tibet to China came into being. His historical introduction is very sketchy.

Mr. Patterson uses very little documentation but writes from personal knowledge of the country and particularly of the Eastern provinces where the anti-Chinese insurrection originally broke out. He points out that ethnic Tibet—the territory mainly inhabited until yesterday by Tibetan-speaking peoples—was much larger than the area marked as Tibet on modern maps, and that the basic issue which led to the revolt was the Chinese policy of mass settlement of Chinese colonists on Tibetan land. What took place was a nationalist uprising against

alien rule and was far from being a mere resistance of privileged classes to progressive reforms. As a journalist he is pardonably bitter about his inability "to get a line of print into the world's press" on the struggle until at last the *Daily Telegraph* began to publish his articles. Western editors were apparently sceptical of the authenticity of information so flatly denied by both Delhi and Peking, though a glowing tribute to China's progressive achievement in Tibet did find its way into one of them. Less than three weeks before the flight of the Dalai Lama made the Tibetan crisis world news Mr. Patterson was threatened by the Indian Government with expulsion if he did not stop sending "misleading and exaggerated messages" about Tibet to his paper.

Mr. Moraes exposes lucidly and in detail the Chinese techniques of colonisation and "reform" that provoked the revolt of the war-like Khambas against odds which from the start they realised were overwhelming. The most resented Chinese campaign was that aimed against the Lamas, ostensibly as oppressors of the people, but which was, in reality, an attempt to wipe out the Buddhist religion. The long term weapon employed for this purpose is the swamping of Tibet by Chinese immigrants. The writer is severe in his condemnation of Mr. Nehru both for failing to speak up in defence of Tibet's autonomy and for his equivocal attitude towards Chinese aggression in 1950 and 1959, and quotes with approval Jayaprakash Narayan "it is true that we could not have prevented the Chinese from annexing Tibet. But we could have saved ourselves from being party to a wrong."

East Wind Rising. A Long View of the Pacific Crisis. Relman Morin. *Alfred Knopf*. New York. \$5.

The author of this book sets out to discover exactly what went wrong in the Pacific and, more especially, what, if anything, the United States could have done to prevent the final disaster of the victory of the Communists in China and the Japanese military adventure. It is a question which has evoked much stronger and more conflicting feelings in the United States than here since the Americans have always had a very warm and real affection for the Chinese in, so to say, the abstract, stemming from the early days of missionary contacts.

Mr. Morin analyses and explains the story in a manner designed for the uninstructed layman and tells it in human rather than more strictly historical terms. The period covered is from 1920 to 1950, with a backward glance into the nineteenth century to set the stage. He does not fall into the error of putting the blame solely on American policy but does imply that the United States mistakes of judgement and sins of omission made inevitable a course of events that might have been averted. This is particularly true of China, where President Roosevelt's obstinate conviction that all Chinese were basically friendly to the United States, whatever their political colour, hampered Chiang-Kai-Shek and played directly into the hands of Mao-Tse-Tung. The Yalta Agreement gave the Communists the military and industrial base needed for their final assault against the Nationalists.

Relationships between the United States and Japan had been bedevilled from the days of the "exclusion" policy before the first World War and the fog of misunderstanding was equally dense here. Nothing that any American Secretary of State could have done would have prevented the seizure of power by the military clique in Japan, but there was no warrant for Stimson to assume that by exposing the immorality and illegality of Japan's attack on Manchuria he could halt its armies.

By careful selection and compression the author succeeds in explaining a great deal while at the same time bringing to life the vanished world of international Shanghai, the China of the war lords and wide-spread famine, and much else. Much of the book deals with elementary questions and is primarily intended for an American audience but it can be usefully read by a much wider circle.

Impatient Giant ; Red China Today. Gerald Clerk. *W. H. Allen.* 21/-.
The Economic Development of Communist China, 1945-1958. I. J. Hughes and B. E. T. Luard. *Oxford University Press for The Royal Institute of International Affairs.* 22/6.

As with the Soviet Union the major difficulty in assessing the pace of economic development in China lies in the doubts of the accuracy of official statistics. These doubts have scarcely been dispelled by the corrections which the Chinese Government has felt compelled to make from time to time in the past. The authors are under no illusion as to the nature of this difficulty. They provide an abundance of figures presenting impressive evidence of progress only to confess that there is no means of verifying their accuracy and go on to demolish the picture they paint with comments of devastating scepticism. For instance, after quoting the official claims that during the "Great Leap Forward" in industrial production in 1958 (when the output of machine tools was said to have been three times, and that of coal and steel twice, the output of 1957) they add "many of these claims are extremely difficult to credit. There are indeed some signs that during 1958 the statistical procedure employed in China underwent a significant relaxation".

But the book is more than a collection of statistics of uncertain authenticity. It contributes a thoughtful and informative account of various stages in the development of China's present economic system. All the chief aspects of policy and administration are described, changing planning techniques, treatment of private enterprise, location of industry, organisation of labour, the volume of Soviet aid, foreign trade and the re-organisation of agriculture. The last subject is the most interesting for the non-professional reader as it brings out clearly the skill and ruthlessness with which the Government passed from a policy of fostering peasant ownership and redividing the land in the interests of the poorer peasants through various stages of co-operative organisation to throughgoing agricultural collectivism. One of the chief impressions which emerges is of the régime's readiness to experiment ; its willingness to try one expedient after another as circumstances dictate : "It seems that the Chinese Government rather than determining their policies in order to conform with ideological precept, set up new social forms in response to immediate practical requirements and only later devised the ideological arguments to justify them".

The authors show conclusively that despite all that has been done to bring order out of chaos in a country which has been continually devastated for over forty years by civil strife and foreign war, and despite the economic progress made so far, an astonishing achievement as far as it goes, China has still a long path to tread before she can hope to escape from the miseries of Asian poverty. The ambition of her leaders would seem to be to equal the present output of British industry by 1973, but this is an ideal prospect for a country with a population twelve times that of the United Kingdom and still growing at a terrific rate.

Mr. Clark, who is a Canadian journalist, was lucky enough to get into China in the autumn of 1958 when his English colleagues were being refused entry. He witnessed the intense national effort to increase the output of steel, from the inside and detected behind it a reassertion of Chinese ways of life and of distinctive Chinese solutions to their industrial problems ; he sensed something of a nationalist as well as an economic "take-off". This is in the front rank of the many books written by journalists after a first visit. Just how passionate was this Chinese feeling of power and rebirth emerges not merely from the description of the communes but also from the way in which for a time western trained doctors who were thoroughly conversant with modern clinical medicine were made to study traditional Chinese medicine and apply it in their practice. The Communist Party has been thoroughly transformed into a Chinese organisation, applying Chinese methods and making use of Chinese capacities, it is regarded as the sole source of the magic power which can transform the fortunes of the country. To be an expert was not enough unless you also held the proper

political faith, if you had that, then everything was possible. Although some of the excesses of this overweening self-confidence have now disappeared—with the application of Chinese medicine in its pristine purity—the mood of enthusiasm remains. There is no evidence of any real opposition to the régime and this remains true even when allowance is made for the silencing of criticism after the summary ending of the blooming of “a thousand flowers” interlude. The author notes the complete absence of class warfare as apparent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the emancipation of women which has, in effect, turned them into men and into full-time labourers at that. But there is no evidence whatever of widespread discontent. In fact it would seem that China is returning to the traditional belief that the Celestial Kingdom is the repository of a peculiarly superior civilisation from which all foreign influences should be excluded—a view, incidentally, that has much to be said for it in the light of history.

American Foreign Policy. Louis J. Halle. *Allen and Unwin*. 25/-.

America the Vincible. Emmet John Hughes. *Penguin*. 3/6.

Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics. Kenneth Thompson. *Princeton University Press*. London : *Oxford University Press*. 40/-.

All three authors are acutely aware of the problem posed by the time-lag between events and American public thinking, a lag which has had, indeed still has, the most unfortunate results, on the formation and execution of foreign policy. Take for instance the colonial question ; it is only now that at last American public opinion appears to be realising the immense changes which have taken place in that field during the past decades ; changes not only of attitude but of practical politics. Mr. Khrushchev's Victorian radical oratory at the United Nations may do more to re-educate United States thinking on the subject than years of propaganda from the ex-Colonial Powers could achieve. Since the authors are alike concerned to use American history to illustrate the theme of the contrast between ideal and reality, between the aspirations which in the public mind lie behind United States policy and the results of that policy, or lack of it, in practice and since that history is short all three books cover much of the same ground.

Mr. Halle is one of a distinguished group of former members of the American State Department who have retired into the academic study of American foreign policy of which Mr. George Kennan is another. His book covers the years when, protected by British sea power America was fortunate enough not to need a foreign policy to the period when torn between isolationism and involvement she found herself drawn inexorably into the Phillipines and for the next fifty years, in spite of having become an imperialist power, still tried to live up to the American dream of an Utopian apartness, content to improvise her relationship with Japan and China on a day-to-day basis with little continuity of direction. This road led finally to Pearl Harbour, a rude awakening which still stultifies her Far Eastern policy to a large extent. At last, however, in the Truman doctrine she equipped herself with a foreign policy applicable to the facts of the twentieth century and with the Marshall Plan assumed the position of leadership to which her great and growing power committed her. The book is most attractively written, Mr. Halle's approach to his country's predicament being both sympathetic and ironic. The truths he seeks to drive home are wittily expressed and, since the work is based on a series of lectures given in Geneva in 1957, it is refreshingly free from pomposity, as witness his aphorism “Every nation is best known by its cant”.

Mr. Hughes devotes himself primarily to an analysis of the false concepts and the philosophical confusion which he considers underlies the traditional American failure to distinguish between the sphere of morals, as instanced in the use of non-recognition as a vehicle for expressing moral disapproval and in the vageries and contradictions in the policy pursued in Europe between “containment”, and “liberation”, and that of politics. He argues in favour of constant, though

private negotiation with the Soviet Union, a long cry this from "open covenants, openly arrived at", and makes a devastating attack on the doctrine of negotiation from strength which he holds to be based on an intellectual fallacy. The book has made a great impression in the States but for the English reader it is couched too much in the rhetorical tones of the lay preacher.

Mr. Thompson, associate director of the Social Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation, examines the same set of problems by means of a critical investigation of current American writers, philosophers, columnists and policy planners belonging to what he calls "the realist school". Its leading proponents include, amongst many others, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans J. Morganthau, George F. Kennan, C. B. Marshall, Walter Lippman, James Reston and the author of the book just reviewed, Louis Halle.

The author first explores the views of these men on the nature of man and of politics, the ruling characteristics of the modern state system, the rôle of force and power, the objective foundations of foreign policy, the means of limiting and controlling conflict, the crisis of the nuclear age and the possibilities for the future. He relates these views to the current debate on liberalism versus conservatism, and discusses how far policy-makers can allow themselves to be guided by political theory. He goes on to consider three fundamental world problems in the light of realist theories: international morality; collective security; and the dilemma of current United States policy in regard to armaments, diplomacy and colonialism. Finally coming to the ultimate and central problem of what political realism may have to offer in securing peace he comes to the conclusion that a realistic diplomacy guided by liberal convictions provides the best and most flexible instrument for attaining that aim in the troubled world of today.

The United States in World Affairs 1959. Richard P. Stebbins. London; *Oxford University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations.* 48/-.

This volume of the series is a well written and fair-minded account of American foreign policy in 1959 and as such particularly valuable to the English student of world affairs. Considering the complexity of the subjects dealt with it is commendably concise, a virtue that is not often found in American productions of a similar type. The events covered include the visits of Mikoyan and Khrushchev to the United States, the death of Mr. Dulles, the flight of the three Soviet moon rockets and President Eisenhower's visits to Europe, Asia and Africa. The year also saw the renewal of Chinese pressure in South and Southeast Asia, the political realignment in the Middle East resulting from developments in Iraq and the United Arab Republic, the marked acceleration of the independence movement in Africa, an acceleration which has since become an avalanche, and an intensification of the conflict over Algeria. Perhaps the most hopeful development was the conclusion of the twelve nation treaty reserving Antarctica for peaceful purposes and, from the United States point of view, the most disturbing the success of the Cuban revolutionary challenge.

Documents on International Affairs. 1956. Selected, edited and introduced by Noble Freeland assisted by Vera King.

Documents on International Affairs. 1957. Selected, edited and introduced by Noble Freeland assisted by Vera King.

Both published by the Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 70/- each.

These two volumes give a wide-ranging selection of much of the basic material needed for the study of contemporary history and are only three years behind events. They are most ably edited and presented and form an invaluable source of information, not only for the scholar and the student but also for the more general reader interested in international affairs whose memory is apt to be quite surprisingly selective in what it chooses to retain or discard.

The first volume deals with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and its aftermath, the outbreak of the Poznan riots in Poland and the revolutionary

uprising in Hungary. That for 1957 covers the return to the *status quo ante* in the cold war, the continuing deadlock over disarmament, the increasing involvement of the Middle East in the power tug-of-war and the open display of Arab disunity. Both volumes deal with a number of subsidiary issues and both, unavoidably, since the series is arranged annually, leave a number of loose ends. It has been suggested that a strict arrangement by years is not the best way to handle the material, whether any other method could be employed is an open question.

Survey of International Affairs. 1955-56. Geoffrey Barraclough and Rachel F. Wall. *Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.*

This volume of the Survey of International Affairs covers a period which includes the Bandung Conference, the "Summit" Conference at Geneva, and the Austrian settlement, all developments tending towards a weakening of the cold war. It also covers the admission of Germany to N.A.T.O. and the signing of the Baghdad and Warsaw Pacts which sharpened these divisions so that the two influences more or less cancelled each other out. The book concludes with the opening moves in the Suez crisis.

It is becoming more difficult to assess the importance of this series. The volumes now appear some two years behind the companion series of "Documents on International Affairs" and some four to five years behind the actual events. The ground covered is so vast that it is not possible to do much more than to give the bare outline of events with a minimum of grace notes and it is too soon for any very sound estimate of the final outcome of the trends which emerge in each period. However, this will find a useful place on the reference shelves with its fellows.

The Fifth Republic. Dorothy Pickles. *Methuen.* 15/-.

De Gaulle's Republic. Phillip M. Williams and Martin Harrison. *Longmans.* 25/-.

France: The New Republic. Raymond Aron. *Stevens.* 21/-.

France: Troubled Ally. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. *Oxford University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations.* 37/6.

These four books are written in the shadow of events whose consequences are still far from clear so that they can only be regarded as the first attempts to draw up a temporary balance sheet of gains and losses in the immediate past. They are, at anyrate, proof of the inexhaustible fascination which France exercises over the minds of all those nurtured in the western tradition.

Mrs. Pickles confines herself to a detailed exposition of the new constitutional framework of the Republic. She explores its ambiguities, the reduced part allotted to Parliament, the disequilibrium between legislature and executive and details the powers of the President. There is a very useful chapter on the institutions of the French Community and how they function. She writes of the Algerian struggle purely from the constitutional angle, without discussing the wider aspects. The book is commendably clear and accurate on a subject on which it is not easy to be either, and there are a number of illuminating comments. The author demonstrates to what an extent the whole system is dependent upon de Gaulle. She does not go into the question of its chances of survival when he finally leaves the scene.

Messrs. Williams and Harrison have compiled an analytical chronicle of events and their treatment is on a more realistic plane, in the sense that they are not so much concerned with structure as such, as with the actions which brought the Fifth Republic into being. They draw up an excellent balance sheet of the Fourth Republic and give a more controversial account of the factors which led to its fall. They then proceed to a description of the inauguration of the new regime and end their account in 1960.

The book is packed with information and covers all the important issues including the Algerian war up to the collapse of the settler revolt. Although

the author's summary of the situation is able and intelligent they do not make sufficient allowance for the difficulties of arriving at any final settlement which would be acceptable to the majority of those affected. Both books are accurate and competent guides, and, short of the passion and vividness of partisan writing that is all that can be expected of any writer at this juncture.

The main theme of Mon.Aron's book is that the Fourth Republic fell not so much through its own sins of omission or commission, but by reason of the magnitude of the problems which confronted it. Contrary to its popular image it did, in fact carry through the reorganisation and modernisation of French industry, a herculean task. France was welded into the Common Market and reluctantly brought to accept the necessity of German rearmament. Where it failed was in dealing with the dissolution of the Empire in Indo-China and Algeria. But it was not so much the instability of the Government that prevented the solution of the Algerian problem as that no majority could have been found, and it remains doubtful if it can be found even now, either in the country or in the Assembly, for any feasible settlement. He thinks that the new Constitution is aimed at the wrong target since the influence of the Government has been increased by weakening the power of the Assembly and increasing that of the President. But he acknowledges that at least the Government has the power to impose an Algerian settlement in the last resort.

Two uncertainties threaten the stability of the new regime. The relations of France with black Africa and Algeria. Whether de Gaulle's genius can suffice to solve them remains to be seen. To this conclusion we should now add a rider in the shape of a third problem, that of France's relations with her western allies and in particularly with Dr. Adenauer.

Mr. Furniss feels that France has signally failed to solve the problem of combining liberty with authority. His book is based on two periods of study in France in 1958 and 1959, and seeks to examine and explain French foreign policy in the past and the prospects for the future in the light of the political, economic and social setting which shapes it. He sees the sway of the Fourth Republic as a record of a long and inglorious period of procrastination and delay but considers that the leaders of the two Republics had, and have, much in common in the aims of their foreign policy. Both wished to see France a great Power, armed with her own nuclear weapons. Both wished to build up a united Europe based on Franco-German amity, a new entente. The difference is that, de Gaulle as a result of his unshakeable belief in the destiny of France and of her ability to regain her past grandeur added to his personal magnetism, has been given a blank cheque by the nation. Mr. Furniss is extremely sceptical of the possibility of such a renaissance but at the same time warns against too hasty a denial "because of the annoying intransigence of its representatives abroad" of the international role claimed by Gaullist France. The regime has restored the confidence of the French in themselves and has gone a long way towards enabling them to solve with dignity the problem of decolonisation which in greater or lesser degree faces, or has faced all the old and once powerful nations. The United States should, the author feels, actively endorse a liberal solution of the Algerian problem.

Disengagement. Eugene Hinterhoff. Foreword by Sir John Slessor. *London : Stevens.* 45/-.

Chance for Survival. Louis J. Halle. *New York : Harper Brothers.* \$2.75.

The Great Deterrent. A collection of lectures, articles and broadcasts on the development of strategic policy in the nuclear age. Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor. Foreword by General Alfred M. Gruenther. *London : Cassell.* 30/-.

Deterrent or Defence. B. H. Liddell Hart. *Stevens.* 30/-.

Defence : Policy and Strategy. E. J. Kingston McCloughry. *Stevens.* 25/-.

N.A.T.O. in the 1960's. Alistair Buchan. *Weidenfeld and Nicholson*. 12/6.
The Uncertain Trumpet. Maxwell D. Taylor. *Stevens*. 30/-.
Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. Bertrand Russell. *Allen and Unwin*. 7/6.

These eight books all contribute in varying measure of importance to the great debate on nuclear weapons and defence policy that has been raging for the past few years. Separately and together they argue the case from many angles and differ surprisingly little in the main in the conclusion which they draw, at least as to the aims which we should attempt to achieve.

Captain Hinterhoff, a former member of Poland's Supreme Command, argues the case for disengagement in Europe with great sincerity and genuine conviction. In Part I he examines the status quo as a workable concept and decisively rejects it as dangerously inadequate. Part II is devoted to an attempt to find a solution to the problem of a divided Germany and therefore a divided Europe. In Part III the author sums up the pros and cons of the question in emotional, political and military terms and finally provides a blue print for a possible settlement in Europe.

The urge to improve the situation in Europe has given the idea of disengagement far wider appeal than its practicability as a working method would warrant. According to the author's diagnosis the chief factors militating against it are a negative element in Western political and military thinking, the recalcitrance of the Russians and the aspirations of Western Germany. Disarmament by itself would be no guarantee that political and military tension would be eased—the power to destroy would remain and might at any time be used for other than deterrent purposes.

He visualises a situation where foreign troops are withdrawn to the Atlantic seaboard and Russian forces to an area east of Rumania and the Baltic States. The whole area concerned would become atom-free and those countries affected by the plan, including Germany, would adopt a policy of military non-alignment. Germany itself would achieve re-unification, would be allowed a home-defence force, and would have little apparent responsibility beyond that under such circumstances, and with her booming economy set free from military commitments there would be little to prevent her becoming the dominating power in central Europe. It is, moreover, far from certain that, in the confined area thus delimited, there would remain sufficient room for the deployment of the western forces, army bases, equipment and training areas.

The book is a difficult one to summarise since the author supports his argument with an immense mass of material, including an exhaustive catalogue of the many disengagement proposals for Europe, accompanied by illuminating comments. The immediate reaction provoked is disagreement since the problem is looked at from a purely military angle and all political and economic questions are ignored.

Mr. Halle attacks the question from a wider angle. He suggests that the basic problem of the strategic revolution which has taken place is not the devastating power of nuclear weapons alone—without them the world could be equally ruined by the massive employment of gas or germ warfare, although ultimate recovery would be more predictable. The real problem, he suggests, arises from a technological-ideological dilemma. "The power of nuclear weapons makes an unlimited conflict unthinkable, while the revolutionary character of the Communist Powers makes limited conflict impossible." Mr. Halle is an optimist inasmuch as he feels that the power of the available weapons, which is ever increasing, weighs more heavily in the scale than the ideological incentive. It does not matter if the Communists continue to believe in the final over-throw of the West so long as they also continue to see that a major war is a futile means of achieving this aim. Unfortunately, on present showing, while the logic of this argument seems to be fully grasped by the Russian leaders, it would appear to have made little if any impression upon the Chinese who do not seem to have realised the implications of the nuclear stalemate.

The passage of time will, in the author's opinion, erode the Communist objective ; the challenge, without being withdrawn, will vanish as the challenge of Islam to Christianity disappeared. This reasoning may serve to reassure those who seek a justification of official Western policy and those sceptical of the solutions pressed by advocates of nuclear disarmament on the limitation of weapons and even by legalistic means. But the snag is that the Western position may become eroded by a series of minor aggressions, none of them large enough individually to warrant the use of the major nuclear deterrent. To a certain extent, Mr. Halle's thesis has been overtaken by events, since it is now generally agreed that the tactic of the West is to find means of countering minor wars without launching a major nuclear holocaust. The scale of the weapons employed corresponds, as he rightly observes, not to international agreements or to unilateral declarations, but to the issues involved in the war and the power of enemy retaliation. In resisting minor aggression the West must therefore fight for strictly limited objectives, must clearly provide adequate conventional armed forces for limited action, and must be able to control war fever. Neither task is one easily fulfilled in democracies which in peace time tend to be militarily inert and in war time tend to be singularly violent. There is, unfortunately, no attempt to tackle the crux of the problem, the social, economic and political issues raised by the attempt to maintain both the great deterrent and the means of graduated resistance.

The principal value of *The Great Deterrent*—which Sir John characterises as *The Great Stalemate*—is that it shows how a man who has always played an important and, since 1937, a leading part in the development of air power kept an open mind, never got caught in the vice of rigid doctrine but adjusted his attitude to evolving techniques while, at the same time, never hesitating to criticise his own mistakes and those of his service in the light of later development.

These collected papers begin with an analysis which the author made in 1933 of the German 1914 plan of attack and end with an article written on British defence policy in 1957. The age spanned opens with air power as an insignificant instrument of reconnaissance and ends with it as one of the dominating factors in international affairs and the heart of any strategy.

The book is especially addressed to young officers of today for whom it should be an invaluable guide and inspiration. But it is also of value to a much wider public as a document of contemporary history, lucidly written with the most commendable lack of bias.

In "Deterrent or Defence" the author describes the state of nuclear parity which we have reached as "nuclear nullity" and the strategic conclusions which he draws from this are harsh but not necessarily totally discouraging. The possession of the bomb is simply a question of preventing the other side from using its bomb, so that N.A.T.O.'s defensive sword becomes a suicidal weapon. But he argues persuasively that western efforts to provide an acceptable conventional defence in Europe need not be ruinously expensive or beyond its capabilities. The vital proportion of 3-1 in modern defence can give a reorganised N.A.T.O. the prospect of holding its own so long as its tactical efficiency is sufficiently increased.

Captain Hart recommends a small strategic bombing force, the use of mixed forces—armour, light-infantry and a continental militia—in place of the existing heavily armed infantry divisions and an extensive redeployment of available manpower, cutting our losses in the Middle Eastern and Far Eastern bases—in any case inevitable in the long run. He sets forth a number of highly technical ideas on the training of airborne and amphibious forces. Tactically he emphasises the value of night combat.

His most provocative suggestion is for the use of chemical weapons in the last resort to contain an aggressor in preference to triggering off mounting nuclear exchanges. He discounts the emotional revulsion against poison gas on the ground that the weapon is relatively humane because "the military effect

could be and was achieved without the destruction of towns and devastation of countries inevitably provoked by explosive weapons". Will the employment of nerve gas, producing a temporary disablement, be the next step in warfare? Liddell Hart seldom "pontificates" without result.

Air Vice Marshal Kingston McCloughry's book is a highly professional work which is likely to become a standard text-book for staff colleges. The author refuses to regard war as either unlikely or impossible and devotes himself to the consideration of how it might be fought in whatever form it may come. "In particular we should not allow ourselves to be faced with these two specially unattractive possibilities : either total war and the end of our civilisation or total peace at the cost of total surrender". Policy and strategy must therefore be directed towards the consideration of all those military problems lying between these two extremes.

The book is a mine of information on the various defence agencies in Whitehall and their histories, and in this connection he touches upon a very important point. The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Committee will, he argues, demand a fairly tight day to day control of operations in any future local limited wars because of the inherent danger that they may develop into total war.

Mr. Buchan is not concerned with war in the abstract, but with the immediate politico-strategic problems now facing the West. His book is the first of a series to be produced by the Institute of Strategic Studies, but it is in no sense a group production, being a highly individual work and, as such, possessing urgency as well as an outstanding command of technical data.

The main thesis of the work is already widely known. Since N.A.T.O. was launched, one of its chief supports, American nuclear supremacy, has almost totally disappeared, added to which the presumed superiority of tactical nuclear weapons in defence is totally discredited. As a result, the alliance is showing signs of developing into a collection of inefficient nuclear powers striving for nuclear self-sufficiency at the expense both of genuine inter-dependence and of conventional forces, sufficiently powerful and well-equipped to enable them to deal with any emergency. The author's proposals to remedy the situation—a greater mobility of N.A.T.O. forces and a mobile reserve ; the concentration on improvement of conventional weapons rather than the further refinement of nuclear ones ; the development of a N.A.T.O. missile pool in which the British and French contributions should be merged—are already becoming orthodox and have, to some extent, affected official actions.

In fact the book is now required reading for the general public rather than for the experts for the vital question now is : how far will public opinion back the two essential requirements if N.A.T.O. is to function as originally intended ; an increased contribution of money and manpower from the European members, including ourselves, and a far greater pooling of national sovereignty in a genuinely effective alliance. These proposals demand sacrifices but offer the best hope of security in an exceedingly dangerous world.

General Maxwell D. Taylor is one of the most distinguished American soldiers of recent times. His last appointment, Chief of Staff of the Army, ended just over a year ago. Perhaps as a result of the never-ending Congressional hearings, high-ranking United States officers are far more uninhibited than their opposite numbers in expressing their views, and the most fascinating part of this book lies in the astonishing revelations of inter-service rivalry ; the work of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff system, its relations with the Secretary of Defence and the fashion in which American policy became tied to nuclear war, and the shape and strength of the armed forces came to be determined by the " budget makers ". Until the writer's term was almost ended the Army was always virtually in a minority and was the chief sufferer when cuts in appropriations were made. General Taylor finds the modernising of defence so faulty that it is probably beyond reform and requires radical re-organisation.

In general he draws the same conclusion as Liddell Hart : that the policy of " massive retaliation " has been tragically over-emphasised, but he accepts the use of tactical weapons as reinforcing a policy of " flexible response " without analysing the possible consequences. His proposed programme embodies a reduced deterrent so long as it is " mobile, concealed and dispersed ", with the retaliatory forces protected by missile batteries and a more developed early warning system. With these changes would go the modernisation of conventional forces overseas, but only a slight increase in their numerical strength would be necessary. He adds that conventional forces should be prepared to fight without nuclear weapons. This is the picture of an accomplished service-man, aware that something is wrong but entangled in coils of bureaucratic red-tape. Since America is unavoidably the strongest power in the alliance, she should be able to give a very much clearer lead to her allies.

Finally Lord Russell offers us a " fine mess of high thinking ". Many of the arguments he sets forth in this book seem at first sight to be flatly contradicted by his latest plea for civil disobedience in support of unilateral nuclear disarmament. Here he roundly opposes unilateralism, pacifism and passive resistance as insufficient means of achieving their object. The only hope for mankind lies in a change of heart and in universal agreement to re-educate the peoples of the world on anti-nationalist lines with complete tolerance between ideologies. After this has been achieved, and only afterwards, a supreme world authority would be created with irresistible armed forces at its disposal. As an interim measure he proposes a solemn renunciation of war and the removal of various sources of local tension. Russia should join the Western powers in guaranteeing the Israeli frontier from attack ; Formosa must be handed back to China, and all foreign forces must be withdrawn from Europe. The peoples of central and eastern Europe would then throw off their Communist regimes and choose democracy since they would have no serious reason to fear a Russian invasion because then immunity would be guaranteed.

We are given a blue-print laid up in Heaven, but no very clear indication what means are to be employed for its realisation on earth. From such an astringent and sceptical mind this is strange fare indeed—the blaze of apocalyptic vision appears to have obscured on this occasion the pitfalls of reality which beset our path.

European Assemblies. Kenneth Lindsay. Stevens. 35/-.

Mr. Kenneth Lindsay is the acknowledged British authority on the parliamentary aspects of the various European groupings. He has a long and intimate experience of the day-to-day working of the Council of Europe and the Assemblies of the Six and no one is better equipped than he to explain their structure and their methods to the uninitiated.

The present book consists of the Report which he wrote of the proceedings at the Hague Conference on European Assemblies in 1958 together with a long Appendix containing a series of papers delivered there. There is also a very useful table setting out the various Organisations and Assemblies so that their ramifications are visible at a glance. The work provides a fund of invaluable background material and carries a stage further the exposition of the subject which the author provided in an earlier work " Towards a European Parliament."

The advice given on how best to solve membership difficulties is perhaps of rather more doubtful value since no amount of purely technical alteration, the merging of one Assembly with another, linking this organisation with that, amalgamating the various headquarters, centralising and streamlining the different administrations, can produce really effective results until the political difficulties which divide the governments of Europe are resolved.

- On Alien Rule and Self-Government.** John Plamenatz. *Longmans*. 21/-.
- Lugard ; The Years of Authority ; 1918-1945.** Margery Perham. *Collins*. 50/-.
- Constitutional Developments in Nigeria.** Kaln Ezer. *Cambridge University Press*. 30/-.
- Awo. The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo.** *Cambridge University Press*. 25/-.
- Nigeria ; The Political and Economic Background.** *Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs*. 6/-.
- Africa in Transition.** Edited by Prudence Smith. *Reinhardt*. 15/-.
- A New Deal in Central Africa.** Edited by Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt. *Heinemann*. 21/-.
- Year of Decision.** Phillip Mason. *Oxford University Press for Institute of Race Relations*. Cloth 21/- . Paper 12/6.
- Central African Emergency.** Clyde Singer. *Heinemann*. 30/-.
- The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.** A. J. Hanna. *Faber*. 21/-.
- East African Chiefs.** Edited by Audrey Richards. *Faber*. 42/-.
- Race and Politics.** Edward Clegg. *Oxford University Press*. 30/-.

Very few people in this country still enjoy an unquestioned faith in the blessings of colonialism, but even fewer can still believe that self-determination for colonial peoples is the real answer to their economic and political needs. Colonialism can only be maintained by an ever-increasing use of force. Self-determination leads straight back to total chaos or the creation of units too small to be viable in the modern world.

In this brilliant book Mr. Plamenetz is concerned not so much to help us to make up our minds as to argue the case from all angles, breaking down dogmatism in the process. He first summarises all possible arguments for the retention of colonialism—and the case has seldom been better put—and then demolishes the arguments he has marshalled so adroitly.

He succeeds in proving beyond controversion that there is much to be said on both sides. But the problem of Britain's relations with its former dependencies today is not one of bigotry or dogmatism. On the contrary, we are profoundly confused. What is needed, therefore, is not a coruscating display of intellectual gymnastics but a sober attempt to shed some light on the path, not food for thought but grounds on which to act. We are left with the conviction that none of the essential conditions for free democratic societies exists in those countries from which Britain is withdrawing, but that all that can be done is to resign ourselves to leaving behind tyrannical factions, masquerading as popular governments, since we can no longer effectively influence the situation. While it would be unfair to criticize the author for not laying down any precise policies for dealing with the problems, since his aim is avowedly to clarify thought, such lucid reasoning leading to no valid conclusion can be as harmful in its results as muddled thinking leading to the wrong conclusions, for it leaves the reader, uninformed and otherwise, to draw whatever inferences may suit his purpose. Happily there are some signs that the ex-colonial peoples themselves are beginning to recognise the more intransigent elements of political life, although it is too soon to prophesy whether this realisation will save them from shipwreck. What must be attempted is to combine a clear sense of purpose while resisting external pressure arising from the muddled thinking of others. The Congo may have done much to temper the attitude of the latter in favour of the hard-pressed colonial administrations.

The next four books all deal with Nigeria, about which very little is generally known since it has escaped the pervasive plague of excessive nationalistic fervour and has slid smoothly into freedom without violence or bloodshed. If it holds together, and the divisive elements run deep, it will have the largest population in Africa, equal to that of Egypt plus the Sudan, six times that of Ghana and three

times that of the Congo. Its political structure sets a new pattern both constitutionally and in the relations between the tribes and parties and, whether it succeeds or fails, is likely to have widespread repercussion throughout the continent. If it is successful, it could become the great stabilising factor in the African equation.

Without Lugard—its first Governor-General in 1918—Nigeria could hardly have emerged in such an almost miraculous manner as a single country. Not only, as recounted in Miss Perham's previous volume of this biography, did he largely delimit its frontiers, so ensuring its present stature as the greatest State in the African Continent, he also was the first to unite the North and South in a single administration during the decisive pro-consulship that forms the central theme in this second volume, which appears so pat to the moment. The debt is flatly acknowledged at the beginning of the book, and it must be confessed that the administrative device which he employed so widely, indirect rule, is now recognised in many quarters as having become a stumbling block to the development of modern Nigeria. But given the meagre resources of men and money at his disposal, there was really no other course open to him save to govern through the Emirs and Chiefs as agents of the British connection. And for many of the later abuses of the system it is not his original plan that is at fault so much as the excessively doctrinaire rigidity in applying it of some of his successors. Moreover, he based himself largely on the example of the Victorian Indian Empire and in his day there was little knowledge or appreciation of the realities of African tribal organisation.

It is said that the application of indirect rule in the North resulted in stagnation and backwardness, which by the 1950's had entailed the entrenchment of almost insuperable obstacles both to self-government and Nigerian unity, and that the main impulse for independence came from Eastern Nigeria where it was not applicable. The Ibo's, the most backward of tribes from Lugard's standpoint because the least equipped to learn, in fact set the pace by adopting the Anglo-Saxon system of local government which he considered so unsuitable for savage races. Furthermore, as Miss Perham admits, the nearest analogy to the native Indian State which he found in the South, the successor kingships to the Yoruba empire of Iyo, he entirely misunderstood.

His outstanding achievement was to win the loyalty of the Emirs and, with their help, to carry through the basic reforms so urgently required, the abolition of slave-dealing, torture and inter-tribal war and the introduction of a system of justice, and it is Lugard's North that, for all its shortcomings, now leads an independent Nigeria, united through a federation that is fitted to make use of the political expertise of the Northern Emirates. Though it has a shortage of educated men, it has a long tradition in the training for rule, in the ability to take decisions and to wield authority.

Miss Perham has here a tale harder to tell than the adventure and personal drama of Lugard's early life, but the interest and pace is well maintained into the executive period of his career, divided between Nigeria and Hong-Kong, and between the years of authority as Governor and the years of retirement as a man of ideas and propaganda and an elder statesman. This freshness and immediacy is the result of the fact that events are regarded from Lugard's angle of vision throughout, a feat largely made possible because he was, for reasons of health, separated from his wife, Flora Shaw, for long stretches of time. She was a brilliant woman who understood his work and was intensely interested in it, and their separation produced a correspondence which accurately reflects his activities, his official acts and official battles, and his personal reactions to them. Added to this is the inestimable advantage of Miss Perham's personal association with him for part of the time. Lugard emerges from these pages as a man of impressive stature and outstanding virtues to whose guiding principles of colonial governorship Nigeria has reason to be grateful.

Mr. Ezra has produced a most remarkable and valuable book. The writing of contemporary history is difficult at the best of times. There is too much

detailed evidence available, too much personal entanglement, too much stress of emotion, of partisan predilection and too restricted an access to the official files. Even with the utmost integrity, the historian can scarcely hope to abstract himself entirely from the events of his day, especially when these events include war or a struggle for independence. Such detachment becomes hardest of all in a country passing through the final stages of colonial rule, for anyone of any education or political capability is closely implicated in the struggle, not only for freedom but also for power.

The author, educated in America and England and holding office in the Zikist party, has managed to achieve a most astonishing degree of impartiality and detachment which occasionally makes him somewhat too cautious in stating his own conclusions. His analysis of the political and constitutional developments burks no issues and is full, clear and honest. The book is, however, not easy reading, but the number of authorities quoted, though somewhat daunting to the general reader, and its lucid presentation should make it a prescribed study for young Nigerians so absorbed in present events that they have neglected to learn about their past. It may startle them to realise the full extent of their debt to their past Governors, in particular to Sir Bernard Bourdillon who may be said to have laid the foundations of modern Nigeria.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo's autobiography is vividly written and gives a fascinating portrait of a man bursting with self-confidence and vitality. The first eight or nine chapters cover his youth and his entry into politics—his struggles for education after his father's death, the shifts to which he was put to get the money he needed, his speculations in cocoa and palm oil and his first steps in becoming a journalist. A section dealing with the political agitation of the past fifteen years leads up to a most interesting final chapter in which Chief Awo sets out his present political position. He expresses strong disapproval of excuses made for African totalitarianism and is extremely sceptical on the subject of pan-African power politics. Both he and Mr. Ezera are acutely conscious of the difficulty of holding an artificially created country together and both are equally convinced that ways must be found of doing so. On all the auspices the voice of independent Nigeria will be one of moderation and good sense.

The Chatham House Memorandum will be invaluable to anyone seeking information on Nigerian history, people, social and constitutional development and economic resources. The book is divided into two parts : Part I consists of a Political and Social survey and Part II of an Economic Survey. Area and population statistics are given in an Appendix and there are a large number of extremely useful maps. This publication provides the quickest route to acquiring the essential basic knowledge about the newest sovereign member of the Commonwealth.

Africa in Transition is a selection of nineteen talks from a series of fifty-one given on the B.B.C.'s Third Programme. Twelve of them are concerned with the Union of South Africa, six with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the odd one consists of an introduction by Lord Hailey. This is far from yet another run of the mill production on the countries covered by it. Apart from Lord Hailey and Mr. Mphahlele, the literary editor of "*Drum*", all its contributors hold academic posts in universities and research institutes in the Union and Rhodesia : most of them are reporting on some piece of social research which they have undertaken and are concerned to illustrate its relation to general issues, while the rest are talking from the point of view of the "racial" group to which they belong.

The painstaking detachment of the contributors, together with the results of the research projects, make this book a most telling indictment of the results of white supremacy in Africa, an indictment which is supported and re-enforced by more recent events. For, as Lord Hailey emphasises in the case of South Africa, the conclusion is that if the standards of life established by the Europeans

is to remain secure, "the supremacy of Europeans in . . . political and social life must be maintained inviolate". In Rhodesia, on the other hand, the test of the declared policy of partnership would be seen in the decisions about the extension of the franchise to Africans. Subsequent events suggest that the result of that test may be equally discouraging.

Lord Hailey argues that as far as the Union is concerned we should await the effect of the impact of economic forces on the political outlook of the dominant European community. The rest of the contributions do not encourage any such hope, nor does the increasing Boer fanaticism which has now culminated in the declaration of a Republic. The book demonstrates clearly that the system of migrant labour is a major source of poverty and of the social, psychological and physical diseases that afflict so much of African life. It is not a system peculiar to the Union, but its persistence there is, as Dr. Kark, Professor of Social Medicine at Natal, says, "the outstanding feature of the South African situation", and he goes on to show its disastrous results on both mental and physical health in the rural areas from which at any one time half their adult males are away working; a situation especially injurious in a community which is, by tradition, a closely knit unit of families and tribes. In a brilliant short essay, Professor Houghton of Rhodes shows how the system depresses wages and condemns workers in perpetuity to unskilled labour while simultaneously reducing productivity in the native areas. Regarded elsewhere as an unfortunate but temporary phenomenon, "it has been going on in South Africa for nearly three-quarters of a century". Professor Olivier of Stellenbosch, in a very good statement of the case for territorial separation, asserts that the policy of integration requires the assumption that the whites "would be prepared to commit political suicide". He does not discuss what would, or will, replace the migrant labour system when, or if, apartheid, as he recommends it, is carried to its logical conclusion. As Dr. Hillman of the South African Institute of Race Relations explains, the actual policy of apartheid, as carried out by the Nationalist Government, is far removed from that advocated by such men as Olivier and, in fact, deliberately increases the number of migrant workers, upon whom, after all, the whole economic structure of modern South Africa is based, with all the attendant evils. The absence of polemics as well as the fact that it comes from residents of the countries make this an invaluable guide to anyone who wishes to understand one of the most menacing problems of our age—race relationships.

"A New Deal in Central Africa" is intended to make a constructive contribution to the problems that will face the forthcoming Round Table Conference between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Governments of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with the Monckton Report before them.

This, in view of the steadily deteriorating political situation and the extreme intransigence of Dr. Banda and his followers, is a most timely warning. The tone throughout is one of cold hostility to the white settlers who have, after all, created the countries which we now know as the Rhodesias. But this does not lessen the force of the arguments advanced, although it does make it extremely unlikely that they could be persuaded to make the constructive abdication of political power which the authors call for.

The point of view from which the book is written is that federation has worked unfavourably for the African majority, that both on the record of Southern Rhodesia during the past fifty years and on that of the Federation Government during the past five it would be unthinkable to transfer more power to the settlers. No matter what safeguards might be devised—and the initial reports of the Monckton Commission findings indicate that the constitutional proposals are extraordinarily elaborate in this respect—it is argued that they would be nullified in practice and any pledges on implementing partnership dishonoured. It is now clear, say the authors, that to give white Rhodesians independence on any such terms would be impracticable after the Nyasaland riots and the Devlin Report. The chapters dealing with the events of the past five years may well

provide African leaders with plenty of ammunition to use when the constitution is reviewed.

But of much more interest are the proposals made for a type of federation that could endure. The authors believe that no safeguards for the majority can work except directly through the ballot box. They suggest that the federal franchise should again be amended in such a way as to give Africans as many votes as the Europeans—this is far short of the universal franchise demanded by the Nationalists and is a very complicated matter in view of the present system of reserved seats, but even so, it is only intended to cover the transition period after which African voters would outnumber the European. Since such concessions would give Africans full control of the Government, it would be necessary to provide immediately afterwards minority safeguards for the whites. These are briefly discussed but, in fact, they would be subject to exactly the same, if not stronger, objections as those already raised. Mr. Leys is frankly doubtful if Africans would accept initial parity with Europeans as adequate; his expression of doubt as to whether they would be willing to concede even so much as parity has just been resoundingly answered by Sir Roy Welensky. As a formal demonstration that no accommodation between the parties can be reached by political means the last chapter is masterly. Yet the book is not useless. The Europeans will certainly have to choose sooner or later between a West Indian solution and the break-up of the federation in a way that would put the whites in the protectorates in the power of an African Government without ensuring that the white Southern Rhodesians would escape a similar fate for more than a few years. While outsiders can see that it might be sensible for the settlers to accept the inevitable, now there is no encouragement here—though the book is temperately expressed—for them to expect much consideration from the triumphant African leaders.

To a certain extent, Mr. Mason's conclusions agree with those just set out, but in the light of events in the Congo his proposals are less sweeping and more practical. He favours the immediate setting up of a Free State of Nyasaland—a title which he holds to be of psychological value in itself—associated with the Rhodesias for external affairs, defence, customs and excise and higher education. He considers that, for lack of anything better, both might accept such a temporary arrangement. In time Northern Rhodesia must follow Nyasaland's path to freedom and Nyasaland must be given the right to complete secession. But he would prefer that this choice should be deferred until the Nyasaland Ministers had presented several budgets and the Free State had gained some experience of running its own affairs as did Nigeria before independence. This tempo of advance, if it is still feasible after the Congo debacle, could perhaps hold a loose federation together for the time being. The choice for Nyasaland is between a delay of two or three years for some hasty education in administration or almost certain collapse with consequent United Nations guardianship and technical aid. Sir Edgar Whitehead has just begun to broach the need of rapid political and social development in Southern Rhodesia which will leave the Europeans in a position something akin to the Jews in Britain or the Parsees in India.

Mr. Singer's account is a personal reaction, lively and entertaining. He has caught the deep underlying faith of all Rhodesians of whatever colour in the infinite possibilities of development of their country. He deals faithfully with the follies of the Government over the past seven years, neither exaggerating nor excusing them. He appreciates the exceptional influence which is exerted by the personalities of the various leaders in the political affairs of each community. His ideas about the future are very tentative, but he is not without hope that a reasonable solution will eventually be found. He sees in the Monckton report the opportunity for more flexible thinking on the part of all concerned.

Mr. Clegg has made a comprehensive and valuable analysis of the racial dilemma drawn mainly in his case from the situation in Northern Rhodesia. His survey is reasoned and exhaustive and is of the greatest assistance in any attempt to understand the plight of African tribal societies faced with the complex

problems posed by the impact of the copperbelt and European settlement. His verdict on the situation is the same, that the racial dilemma is too intricate and the competing interests of African advancement and the maintenance of European standards of living too irreconcilable for the Federation to succeed. He foresees Southern Rhodesia being drawn inexorably into the orbit of South Africa and the prospect of a final racial struggle along the Zambezi.

Dr. Hanna gives a well balanced and fascinating account of Rhodesia's past history—ranging from Mzilgazi and the coming of the missionaries to Cecil Rhodes and Sir Roy Welensky. He is justly critical of the manner in which partnership has been practised, but his sympathies are sufficiently broad to enable him to gain the interest of all those who are anxious to find out from what roots the present conflict stems.

Finally "East African Chiefs", edited by Dr. Richards in collaboration with fourteen colleagues, is an interesting and valuable study of the impact of colonial rule on the indigenous native form of tribal administration, the chiefship. They take thirteen tribes in Uganda and Tanganyika and analyse the results of the introduction of advisory councils, of taxation and salaries in place of gifts and tribute and the gradual erosion of the chief's executive authority over his people. The tribes studied range from the highly organised kingship of the Buganda, a centralised state under a despotic kingship to the Bagisu, a primitive republic made up of sovereign clans. One sobering reflection which emerges is that, if the administrators had put less emphasis on purely western values, much that was good in the indigenous forms of government might have survived and the transition to a more modernised administration made more smoothly. As it is, the first has been destroyed and the western ideas of "democracy" and "freedom" have been seized upon by, in too many instances, xenophobic nationalist leaders, whose capacity to rule the forces they have released is still very uncertain. The change had to come—this book gives a very good idea of how it has been brought about.

Senator Joe McCarthy. Richard Rovere. *Methuen*. 18s.

The Status Seekers. Vance Packard. *Longmans*. 21s.

The Waist High Culture. Thomas Griffith. *Hutchinson*. 21s.

Eisenhower: Captive Hero. Marquis Childs. *Hammond, Hammond*. 25s.

It is generally agreed, and not least by Americans, that there is something wrong with American society. American complacency, based on the claim to have the "know-how" not only of applied technology but of the good life, took a hard knock with the ascent of the first Russian Sputnik, staggered with the recent revelations of teen-age vice and rigged television contents and turned to almost panic-stricken alarm with the Soviet rocket landing on the moon. What had happened to "God's own country", or what had gone wrong with "manifest destiny"? Why were they losing not only their technical lead but their power of moral attraction for the "uncommitted" countries, for the "oppressed colonial peoples struggling to be free"? Modern American society, whose material values are being adopted more and more widely, and not only in the West, as the goal for which to strive, shows some at least of the stigmata characterised in Milton's famous lines "Ill fares the land, to wasting ill a prey, Where wealth accumulates and men decay". The heartening thing is that the most severe and searching criticism of the ills affecting the body politic comes from the Americans themselves. These four books attack the problem from a number of angles and taken together serve to illustrate many aspects of a complex subject.

One of the phenomenon which most appalled the friends of America was the extraordinary rise to overwhelming power of Senator Joe McCarthy, a man without political convictions or any real axe to grind, and possessed merely with the desire for personal power and glory. As shown by Mr.

Rovere he was entirely "inner-directed", unique, himself. He had no wish to change the American system of government or to reform it—he was devoted to destruction purely for its own sake. He was a completely cynical opportunist, who did not even hate the people whom he so carelessly destroyed, a juvenile delinquent with the State Department for his main playground. No lie was too big or too ill-founded, as Hitler before him he discovered that the bigger the lie the more readily it was believed. With the aid of the Press he built up a public picture of himself which rested on the purest fantasy—the most elementary checking of the facts would at any period of his meteoric career have destroyed him. Why did sophisticated political correspondents continue to give credence to man whom individually they recognised as "phoney and a wrecker"?

The behaviour of the Senate was equally incomprehensible to the bewildered foreign onlooker who saw an "historic assembly" being led by the nose by a man who, in hours of hearings before by the Committee of which he was chairman, failed to substantiate one of his charges. Was it that in a political system so subject to graft and pressure no one could be sure of the stance of his neighbour? Or was it complete incompetence in conducting proceedings "with a minimum of procedural competence"? For a time even the redoubtable Foster Dulles was cowed and seemed unable or unwilling to challenge the defamer of the Foreign Service of the United States. What gave McCarthy his power? It may well have something to do with the craving for sadism and sensationalism that is widely spread in American society as evinced by the horror comics and the gangster films, and in a certain tolerance of the criminal element. But in the end McCarthy was destroyed—utterly and almost without a struggle—by the moral showdown which had become unavoidable.

"The Status Seekers" and "The Waist High Culture" both serve to illuminate the background against which McCarthy and his like operate with varying degrees of success. Mr. Packard shows that in a society which equates status with material possessions, the right car, the right house, the right address, the correct number of household gadgets, the possibility of moving up the social ladder is becoming ever more difficult. A man's worth depends on the amount of money that he can earn, there is at bottom no other valid criteria. While at the same time with the growth of enormous business corporations, trade unionism, automation and mass production the opportunities for an individual to make his mark become less and less. Add to this rigidly stratified framework of wealth an equally stratified ethnic structure which excludes amongst others Jews and Negroes, whatever their abilities and possessions, from certain circles and you have a situation in which the American myth becomes progressively more widely sundered from the American reality. This general atmosphere of "make-believe" affects both the "haves" and the "have-nots" with a sense of guilt. The former because they feel that they are betraying the American ideal of equality and the latter because they feel branded as failures.

Mr. Griffiths strikes at the heart of the present American "way of life"; the morals of business. He has much to say on other aspects, the more pungently expressed as his strictures come from the Foreign Editor of *Time*. But while well aware of the incidence of juvenile delinquency and concerned both at the shallowness of the American educational system and at the lack of depth of much of professed religion, he is preoccupied with that moral weakness in American society which business both exemplifies and promotes. He is concerned not only with the "rat race" of New York, but much more with the lack of any cultural values beyond those that can be satisfied and inspired by the market—the only things which are good are those which can be provided by the market at a profit, nothing must stand in the way of making money and anything which if produced does not make a profit is by implication of no importance and

must be discarded. Everything produced is aimed at the "profitable middle" and in promoting sales to that middle level no holds are barred—there is less and less room for excellence in the flood of mediocrity. It is less and less profitable to cater for any taste that cannot be catered for by methods of mass production and cannot be boosted by the mass media.

He blames the President and those around him for much of the ascendancy of big business and protests more than once at the way in which the Press while pillorying the politicians, with justification, hides the faults and failures of business. A society that lives by and for an endless stream of new gadgets marketed by new gimmicks has little chance of competing successfully with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of the dedicated and energetic younger generation in Asia and Africa to whom the stern communist creed makes on the surface so much greater an appeal.

The office of American President is in the modern world an unbearably heavy burden. The President is not only the Head of State, a function which President Eisenhower has worthily fulfilled, but also the head of his government assisted by a Cabinet whose rôle is purely advisory and the leader of his Party. What is right for one of these positions can be wrong, or even fatal for another. He is, moreover, almost certain for part at least of his tenure of office, to find himself in conflict with and possibly hamstrung by a hostile Congress. If Eisenhower came to his office politically as innocent as the babe unborn he has certainly been baptised in the waters of affliction, a baptism in which others have willy-nilly participated. Essentially a good and simple man who believed in the slogans he uttered he has been the "captive hero" of his land and his chosen party. His adaptability which made him such an ideal mediator between difficult allies has, as its corollary, the inability or unwillingness to take decisions, and the inclination to let things slide, to await events rather than to anticipate them, to let others, by their actions, determine the course of his own, though this judgment must be tempered in the light of his initiatives since the death of Dulles. Of his integrity there can be not the shadow of question; but his view of life and events is superficial rather than penetrating and he would still—at least until very recently—seem to believe implicitly that there are no problems that cannot be solved by setting people of differing views, opposed emotions and diametrically opposite aims, round a table to discuss them. There are signs that he is now a sadder and a wiser man. But we must be grateful that in an era of such quick and drastic change President Eisenhower can be said to exemplify to all with whom he comes into personal contact in West or East a man who is, however occasionally misguided, beyond the reach of corruption whatever form it may take.

A History of Modern Japan. Richard Storry. Pelican. 4/-.

This little book, extremely well written and packing an immense amount of information into a small and compact space, provides an excellent background against which to place the recent disturbances in Japan in their proper perspective. The author introduces his study by way of a typical Japanese family to give verisimilitude to the whole.

He devotes one chapter to the history of the early centuries and then plunges straight into modern Japan, beginning his account from the time of the first contact with the West through the Jesuit missionaries in the sixteenth century to the present day. The final three chapters deal with the Pacific war, the American occupation and the shape of the new Japan that has emerged from total defeat. The Japanese people are torn by many sharply marked conflicting trends. The experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki left them with a hatred of America and the West which the mildness and generosity of the occupation period did much to temper, even to the extent of predisposing them towards the United States. With a long tradition of militarism and warlike ferocity they

are now ostensibly pacifist, largely from necessity and because General MacArthur wrote pacificism into the new Constitution. There are strong undercurrents of neutralism, common to all the Asian and African nations who are at present passing through the phase of militant nationalism.

In the last century Japan modernised herself with enthusiasm and with less regret, at least on the surface, than almost any other country for the past which she was sacrificing. The speed of the transformation created an almost unbridgeable gap between the generations and Mr. Storry suggests that the gap between the present generation and its immediate forerunner is no less wide, a contention which the recent assassination of the Socialist leader, Mr. Asanuma, by a right-wing student may go far to prove. The rise of militarism and the strangling of liberalism at its birth have never been better demonstrated than in this book.

Through all the shifting rôles played by the Japanese nation in the past decades the author detects two permanent qualities—the immense vitality of the Japanese people and their love of beauty. What they conspicuously lack is humour and moderation, once the hall-mark of their erstwhile mentors, the Chinese, a lack which may provide a clue to much that is puzzling in contemporary Japan.

Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan. A Study of Post-War Trends. I. I. Morris. *Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.* 50/-.

Dr. Morris, who served in Japan during the occupation period, has been living there for the past three years, after an interlude spent in the Research Department of the Foreign Office. He writes, therefore, from first-hand experience and knowledge as well as from an extensive acquaintance with Japanese history. Much of the material used in his work is derived from first hand sources not easily come by by any one not resident in the country.

The political future of Japan, whether she swings to some form of totalitarianism of right or left, or manages to maintain her fragile democratic structure, is a matter of the greatest importance to the West in the present precarious balance of world power. The loss of Japan, with its high industrial potential to the communist world would be disastrous, but the emergence of a strong right-wing despotism might well prove no less so.

Nationalism is still the strongest force in Japan, far stronger and more deeply rooted in Japanese past history than any of the ideals that became fashionable after the end of the last war, as Professor Maruyama, a distinguished political scientist of Toyko University, is at pains to stress in his very instructive Introduction and he couples it with a warning that to encourage the emergence of a strong right-wing government as a counterbalance to communism at the expense of the liberal-democratic forces would, however tempting, be highly dangerous ; though as Dr. Morris points out, this development would be less certainly a threat to the West than the establishment of a communist dictatorship.

This scholarly study is an exhaustive and detailed account of the right-wing trends and elements set against the historical and social background and the constantly developing pattern of contemporary politics. It is a bewildering labyrinth of shifting forces and personalities through which the author guides us with a sure hand, an invaluable service which puts us much in his debt.

China's Entrance into the Family of Nations. The Diplomatic Phase 1858-1880. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu with a Foreword by William L. Langer. *Harvard University Press.* London. *Oxford University Press.* 46/-.

Save for some shadowy prefiguration in the ancient world present day International law is purely of western European origin and the phrase "the family of nations" only emerged as a metaphorical description of the Christian Western European nations which signed the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, a group later characterized by an ever-increasing expansion beyond the European continent.

Diplomatic history and international law were, therefore, until late in the nineteenth century, almost exclusively concerned with the intercourse between western European sovereign States with some reference to colonial disputes and imperial rivalries. The admission of the Ottoman Empire to the international community in 1858 made little real difference to this picture ; and it was not until the beginning of this century that Japan and the United States emerged as Great Powers in their own right. Now we live in a world of sovereign States whose number is growing with fantastic speed.

Up to 1858 China had dealt with the outside world, when it could no longer avoid doing so, in the light of traditional concepts and principles peculiar to itself and according to which the Middle Kingdom was a universal State claiming lordship over all the barbarians beyond its borders. When Lord Elgin's "gun-boat" diplomacy—forced upon him much against his will, for his sympathies lay rather with the defenceless Chinese than with his fellow-countrymen—finally compelled the Chinese government to break with tradition and come to terms with the hated and distrusted "foreign devils" two mutually exclusive systems were brought face-to-face. The western system gradually prevailed despite a stubborn rearguard action from the entrenched traditionalists.

Dr. Hsu teaches history at the University of California and this book is one of a series sponsored by the Centre for East Asian Studies at Harvard University. Although taking full account of Western actions the author is chiefly concerned with the Chinese view of events. He has drawn extensively upon the rich store of Chinese records available to illustrate the traditional Chinese methods of conducting international relations and the philosophical conceptions underlying these methods, their bitter resentment of the inescapable disturbance of these accepted attitudes and their great reluctance to make the adjustments which were essential once their cherished isolation had been forcibly broken. He gives a brilliant analysis of the stubborn "last ditch" opposition to the establishment of foreign legations in Peking and the Chinese unwillingness to send diplomatic representatives abroad.

The work is divided into a prologue describing the initial encounters of the two families of nations, Part I, dealing with the establishment of foreign legations in China and covering the years 1858-1861 ; Part II, concerned with the introduction of international law between 1862-1874 ; and Part III, with the inauguration of permanent Chinese legations abroad. An Epilogue sums up the Chinese imperial tradition and estimates its role in the modern world. The author suggests that with the recent re-establishment of Chinese rule or influence over the border States and in South East Asia, and with a constant stream of delegations from the Communist States knocking at its door, China may well be coming to believe that its claim to be the "universal" empire may revive in a modern form. This is a fascinating, as well as a most timely, contribution to the study of international affairs.

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